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Abstract 
 
Outside the express criminalisation competences in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, several other Treaty provisions have the potential to serve as legal bases for 
the adoption of EU-level criminal prohibitions. But the requirements for adopting such legislation 
differ notably throughout these various legal bases. In the absence of adequate legal tools to 
counter these divergences under the current legal framework, there is a real risk of cherry-picking 
between legal bases for EU-level criminalisation. Because this must be held unacceptable for 
several reasons, this paper argues for the development of a single legal framework for the 
adoption of criminal prohibitions in EU law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012 the European Commission has submitted a proposal for a new Directive on the fight 
against EU-fraud.1 It aims to require Member States to criminalise in their national laws fraud 
and related illegal activities that negatively affect the EU-budget. The proposal is based on Article 
                                                          
1 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight against 
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, COM(2012) 363 final.  
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325(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union2 (hereinafter: TFEU) which allows 
the EU legislature to enact “the necessary measures” in the field of preventing and combatting 
EU-fraud for the aim of “effective and equivalent protection” throughout the EU.3 The 
appropriateness of this legal basis, however, has been under discussion since the Council Legal 
Service as well as the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs published their 
recommendations to replace Article 325(4) TFEU by Article 83(2) TFEU. The latter provision 
enables the EU legislature to design EU-wide definitions of offences if “essential” for the 
“effective implementation” of a harmonised Union policy.4 According to both the Council Legal 
Service and the Legal Affairs Committee, Article 83(2) TFEU must be qualified as a lex specialis 
and should therefore be considered the proper legal basis for the proposed Directive on EU-
fraud.5 
The example above expresses a lack of clarity with regard to the proper legal basis for EU-wide 
criminalisation of EU-fraud. But the debate on EU criminal law competences goes beyond this 
specific area of crime. One might have expected that the fierce debates on legal bases for 
harmonising substantive criminal law would have been solved by Lisbon’s express criminal law 
competence of Article 83 TFEU. However, today’s state of affairs shows differing views on 
whether Article 83 TFEU applies exclusively or whether other legal bases could be invoked to 
introduce EU-wide rules on criminal law; and if so, how these various legal bases hierarchically 
interrelate to each other.  
 
                                                          
2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Dec. 26 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/47) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
3 See Article 325(4) TFEU (“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the 
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union with a view to affording effective 
and equivalent protection in the Member States and in all the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies”). 
4 See Article 83(2) TFEU (“If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential 
to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonization 
measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions 
in the area concerned…”). 
5 Council Legal Service, Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial 
interests by means of criminal law – Legal basis, doc. 15309/12 (22 October 2012); European Parliament Committee 
on Legal Affairs, Opinion on the legal basis for the proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law, A7-0251/2014 (25 March 2014). 
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This article concerns the exercise of the EU’s competence to criminalise conduct Union-wide; the 
approximation of (levels of) penalties falls outside the scope of this article. The premise of this 
article is that outside Article 83 TFEU a variety of ancillary legal bases do exist to underpin the 
approximation of criminal laws. Under those circumstances there is a real risk of cherry-picking 
between legal bases, which in turn could endanger the legitimacy and coherence of EU criminal 
law. Therefore, the central question of this article is how the rational and consistent exercise of 
criminalisation competences in the EU can be better safeguarded. It is argued that for this aim 
the EU is in need of a single legal framework that should govern the EU legislature during the 
process of initiating and negotiating new definitions of offences, as well as the EU Court of Justice, 
irrespective on which legal provisions such definitions of offences were based.    
The structure of this article is as follows. Part I gives an overview of the express and ancillary 
(potential) criminalisation competences of the EU. In Part II, it will be demonstrated that the 
existence of numerous legal bases with differing legal requirements, and the potentially very 
broad scope of criminalisation competences in the EU, causes the pitfall of cherry-picking 
between those various legal bases. In view of that, Part III argues why such cherry-picking is 
unacceptable in the EU legal order and raises the idea of a single legal framework for EU-level 
criminalisation. Part IV shares some initial thoughts on the content of this single legal framework, 
hoping that this would provoke further debate and research. The article closes with some final 
remarks.   
 
I. POST-LISBON CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCES 
 
The scope of criminalisation powers has since long been a matter for debate.6 The Amsterdam 
Treaty did provide a legal basis to adopt minimum norms with regard to the definitions of 
                                                          
6 For a brief summary on the development of EU criminal law, more generally, see Jannemieke Ouwerkerk, Criminal 
Justice Beyond National Sovereignty: An Alternative Perspective on the Europeanisation of Criminal Law, 23 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF CRIME, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 17-18 (2015). For an overview of the evolvement of substantive 
criminal law competences, see Anne Weyembergh, Approximation of substantive criminal law: The new institutional 
and decision-making framework and new types of interaction between EU actors, in APPROXIMATION OF SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW IN THE EU. THE WAY FORWARD 9-33 (Francesca Galli & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2013) and (pre-Lisbon) Gert 
Vermeulen, Where do we currently stand with harmonisation in Europe?, in HARMONISATION AND HARMONISING MEASURES 
IN CRIMINAL LAW 65-76 (André Klip & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2002) (presenting the 2002 state of affairs regarding 
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offences7, but opinions differed strongly on what areas of crime could be subjected to minimum 
harmonisation8. Moreover, it has been fiercely discussed whether matters of criminal law were 
exclusively governed by the former intergovernmental Third Pillar, or whether criminal law could 
also fall within the then First Pillar of Community Law. I suppose we all remember the European 
Commission’s position regarding both issues. Not only was the Commission in favour of a broad 
interpretation of the Third Pillar competence to adopt EU-wide definitions of offences, it also 
took the view that in certain situations the Community legislature, outside the scope of the Third 
Pillar, would be competent to prescribe criminal sanctions to the Member States. With regard to 
this latter viewpoint, the Commission was put in the right by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union; in the famous 2005 Environment Case, the Court stipulated that the Community 
legislature did have the power to require Member States to introduce criminal sanctions “when 
the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties is an essential 
measure for combating serious environmental offences”9. 
                                                          
harmonisation of criminal law in the European Union). A more elaborate overview of the development of EU criminal 
law has been provided by PETTER ASP, THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCE OF THE EU 24-39 (2012) (providing a 
comprehensive account of the EU’s substantive criminal law powers under the Lisbon Treaty). 
7 See Title VI (“provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”) of the Amsterdam Treaty on 
European Union, Nov. 10 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340/162) [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty). 
8 Some referred to Article 31(e) Amsterdam Treaty as an exclusive competence to enact common definitions of 
offences in the specified areas of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking (see Article 31(e) Amsterdam 
Treaty, supra note 6: “Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: … (e) progressively 
adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties 
in the areas of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking”). This position was for instance taken bij Anne 
Weyembergh, see Anne Weyembergh. Approximation of criminal laws, the Constitutional Treaty and The Hague 
Programme, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1568-1571 (2005) (examining the controversy around approximation of 
criminal laws in the EU and discussing the added value of the (never adopted) Constitutional Treaty for the future of 
approximation in this field of law). Others argued that pursuant to Article 29 Amsterdam Treaty such harmonised 
definitions of offences could also be adopted in the areas of human trafficking, offences against children, illicit arms 
trafficking, corruption, fraud, racism and xenophobia (see Article 29 Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 7: “Without 
prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high 
level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member 
States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism 
and xenophobia. That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in 
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms 
trafficking, corruption and fraud, through:… approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the 
Member States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e)”). See, e.g., Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 70. 
9 Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542 (Environment Case), ¶¶ 47-48; see also the follow-up 
decision Commission v. Council, Case C-440/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:625 (known as the Ship-Source Pollution Case, in 
which the Court confirmed its ruling in Case C-176/03 and annulled a Framework Decision on the matter on the 
ground that Community legislature had a preceding competence to adopt the criminal law provisions at issue, but 
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It seems that we are in a somewhat similar situation under the Lisbon Treaty. Whereas initially 
the express criminalisation competences provided for in Article 83 TFEU seemed sufficiently clear 
and containable10, it is now apparent that outside Article 83 TFEU several other treaty provisions 
may have the potential to serve as a legal basis for the adoption of EU-level definitions of 
offences.  
The following provides an overview of express and (potential) ancillary criminalisation 
competences of the EU. For obvious reasons, this overview starts with mentioning Article 83(1) 
TFEU. This provision encompasses a competence in specified areas of crime, whereas Article 
83(2) TFEU11 envisages a so-called “regulatory criminal law competence”, enabling the EU-wide 
criminalisation of conduct if this “proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a 
Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures”. In order to 
understand the main difference between both paragraphs of Article 83 TFEU, I would like to refer 
to Mitsilegas who pointed out that the two paragraphs of Article 83 TFEU reflect different views 
on criminalisation; whereas Article 83(1) expresses “securitised criminalisation” (criminalisation 
aims to address global security threats; this appears from the explicit mentioning of crime areas), 
the regulatory criminal law competence of Article 83(2) expresses “functional criminalisation” 
(criminalisation serves the effectiveness of EU law).12  
 
 
A. EU Criminalisation Powers in Specific Areas of Crime 
 
                                                          
in which it explicitly held that the determination of the type and level of criminal penalties felt outside the scope of 
the Community’s powers).  
10 Previously, I myself assumed that the EU’s criminalisation powers were exhaustively laid down in Articles 83 and 
325(4) TFEU, compare Ouwerkerk, supra note 6, at 19-20. 
11 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
12 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law Competence After Lisbon: From Securitised to Functional Criminalisation, 
in EU SECURITY AND JUSTICE LAW AFTER LISBON AND STOCKHOLM 110-128 (Diego Acosta Arcarazo & Cian C. Murphy eds., 
2014) (“…EU competence to criminalise can be justified in a twofold manner: upon the need for the Union to address 
security threats (securitised criminalisation); and upon the need for the Union to use criminal law in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of Union law (functional criminalisation”).  
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As said, this paragraph solely focuses on the competences for “securitised criminalisation”.13 It 
describes the (potential) scope of Article 83(1) TFEU and, thereafter, discusses a potential 
alternative legal basis for criminalisation in specific areas of crime.  
 
1. Article 83(1) TFEU: Criminalisation Competence in Specified Areas of Crime 
 
As mentioned before, Article 83(1) TFEU differs from Article 83(2) TFEU in that it expressly 
enumerates the areas of crime in which the EU is competent to enact criminal prohibitions. It 
concerns: terrorism, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of 
payment, computer crime, and organised crime. In these areas of crime, Article 83(1) TFEU 
requires that the types of conduct to be prohibited have a cross-border dimension “resulting 
from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common 
basis”. The competence to enact common norms under the heading of Article 83(1) TFEU is 
restricted to minimum norms, to be adopted by means of directives.14 
 
Whereas at first reading, criminalisation powers under Article 83(1) TFEU might seem restricted, 
its wording leaves ample room for a quite broad interpretation. After all, the enumerated areas 
of crime potentially involve a very broad range of human actions.15 This applies to some areas of 
crime in particular, e.g. organised crime: as rightly pointed out by Mitsilegas, one can think of 
many specific criminal offences that could be characterized as being connected with the activities 
                                                          
13 Id. 
14 See Article 83(1) TFEU (“The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives…establish minimum 
rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a 
cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them 
on a common basis. These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, 
counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime”).  
15 Moreover, other areas of crime may be identified on the basis of a unanimous Council decision, see the third 
paragraph of Article 83(1) TFEU (“On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying 
other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act unanimously after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament”).  
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of an organised crime group.16 Something similar applies to computer crime, also mentioned as 
one of the areas of crime under Article 83(1) TFEU: this concept could cover criminal offences 
that would not immediately be associated with computer crime but could be characterized 
accordingly, simply because of the involvement of a computer, e.g. market abuse17, or sexual 
offences that do not fall within the scope of sexual exploitation of women and children as enlisted 
in Article 83(1) TFEU. Beyond specific areas of crime, EU action has shown that while criminal 
prohibitions mainly cover completed crimes, they increasingly entail inchoate acts as well.18 And, 
in addition to criminalising the actual commission of prohibited acts, it has become quite 
common to also criminalise the aiding or abetting in the commission of a crime.19  
Moreover, whereas the cross-border requirement suggests a real attempt to limit Article 83(1) 
TFEU to the most serious types of transnational crime, the practical impact of harmonised 
criminal prohibitions based on this provision automatically exceeds the transnational sphere; 
national implementation legislation obviously also applies in a purely national context.  
 
Until now four directives have been adopted under the heading of Article 83(1) TFEU, three of 
which include novel criminal prohibitions.20 Directive 2011/92/EU criminalises several acts in the 
field of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, and child pornography.21 Directive 2011/36/EU 
concerns trafficking in human beings, extending the definition of “exploitation” to forced 
                                                          
16 Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 116; See also Ester Herlin-Karnell, White-Collar Crime and European Financial Crises: 
Getting Tough on EU Market Abuse, 34 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW, 483 (2012) (analyzing the feasibility of the then existing 
regime against market abuse and discussing the legal basis of proposed instruments).  
17 This example was given by Ester Herlin-Karnell, see supra note 16.  
18 See, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 2014/57/EU, on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse 
directive), Article 6(2), 2014 O.J. (L 173/87) that criminalises the attempt to commit several forms of insider dealing 
as well as the attempt to commit market manipulation. 
19 See, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 2014/57/EU, id. at Article 6(1) that criminalises the aiding and abetting 
to the unlawful disclosure of information, market manipulation and some forms of insider trading.  
20 The fourth Directive that has been adopted based on Article 83(1) TFEU relates to currency counterfeiting: 
Parliament and Council Directive 2014/62/EU, on the protection of the euro and other currencies against 
counterfeiting by criminal law, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA, 2014 O.J. (L 151). However, 
the adopted provisions do not extend the scope of criminal prohibitions that have previously been adopted in this 
field.   
21 Parliament and Council Directive 2011/92/EU, on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, Articles 3-7, 2011 O.J. (L 335). 
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begging, exploitation of criminal activities, and the removal of organs.22 Directive 2013/40/EU 
includes a number of criminal prohibitions in the area of computer crime: attacks against 
information systems.23  
Moreover, a pending proposal on the basis of Article 83(1) TFEU concerns the definition of drug 
and aims to extend the existing scope of EU-level offences to new psychoactive substances (so-
called “designer drug”) that pose severe health, social and safety risks, and are therefore 
submitted to permanent market restrictions under a newly proposed Regulation.24 With regard 
to this proposal, it can be questioned whether Article 83(1) TFEU is the right legal basis; although 
the deterrence of trafficking in new psychoactive substances has been mentioned as one the 
reasons to extend the scope of prohibited drugs, the main aim of the proposal seems to be the 
prevention of health and social harm. Also pending is a 2015 proposal on combating terrorism 
which – partly in order to implement new international standards and obligations with regard to 
the evolving terrorist threat – proposes the criminalisation of travels to third countries with 
terrorist intentions, being trained for terrorist purposes, and terrorist financial funding provided 
for all terrorism related offences.25 
 
2. Article 79 TFEU: Criminalisation Competence in the Area of Human Trafficking 
 
It is open to debate whether Article 83(1) applies exclusively in the areas of crime it expressly 
enumerates. The issue is of particular relevance with regard to trafficking in human beings. This 
area of crime is explicitly mentioned in Article 79 TFEU on the EU’s task to “develop a common 
immigration policy”. For that purpose, Article 79(2) TFEU enables the EU legislature to adopt 
                                                          
22 Parliament and Council Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, Article 2(3), 2011 O.J. (L 101).  
23 Parliament and Council Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, Articles 6-8, 2013 O.J. (L 218). 
24 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (amending Council 
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA) laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts 
and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, as regards the definition of drug, COM(2013) 618 final.  
25 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (amending Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA) on combating terrorism, COM(2015) 625 final. 
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measures for “combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”.26 
Commentators do not agree on whether this implies a specific criminalisation competence for 
the EU. For Asp, even though the word “combating” does suggest that measures under this 
provision can be of a criminal nature, the express mentioning of human trafficking in Article 83(1) 
TFEU provides a strong argument against criminal law competence under Article 79 TFEU. He 
finds this confirmed by the fact that the EU has adopted a directive on the topic under Article 
83(1) TFEU – the aforementioned Directive 2011/36/EU.27 Satzger, on the contrary, does derive 
from Article 79 TFEU an EU competence to establish “supranational criminal law”, but states that 
when it comes to minimum harmonisation through directives, Article 83(1) TFEU is lex specialis 
to Article 79 TFEU.28 In other words – if I understand Satzger correctly – a regulation on the basis 
of Article 79 TFEU still can include EU-level criminal prohibitions in the area of trafficking in 
persons.29  
 
B. EU Regulatory Criminalisation Powers 
 
Whereas the scope of the express criminalisation competence under Article 83(1) TFEU is defined 
on the basis of areas of crime (as described above), the scope of Article 83(2) TFEU is defined on 
the basis of previously harmonised Union policies. In such harmonised policy areas, minimum 
rules on the definition of offences may be established by means of directives, provided that such 
approximation “proves essential to ensure the effective implementation” of a Union policy.30 
                                                          
26 See Article 79(1) and (2) TFEU (“1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring…the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat…trafficking in human beings. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, 
the European Parliament and the Council…shall adopt measures in the following areas: …(d) combating trafficking 
in persons, in particular women and children”).  
27 See Asp, supra note 6, at 157-160.  
28 HELMUT SATZGER, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 56, 81 (2012) (tracing the influence of international and 
European law on national criminal law).    
29 The issue of hierarchy between legal bases for criminalisation will be elaborated on in Section II.C.2. 
30 See Article 83(2) TFEU (“If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves 
essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 
harmonization measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences 
and sanctions in the area concerned…”). Article 83(2) TFEU is considered a “quasi-codification” of the European 
Court of Justice’s case-law in the Environment Case (Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542) and 
the Ship-Source Pollution Case (Commission v. Council, Case C-440/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:625), in which the Court ruled 
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Outside Article 83(2) TFEU several other Treaty provisions have been mentioned as potential 
legal bases for regulatory criminalisation.  
 
1. Article 83(2) TFEU: Criminalisation in Harmonised Policy Areas 
 
The introduction of Article 83(2) TFEU into the Lisbon Treaty has since led to many discussions 
on its potential and desirable scope. History shows that the European Commission is used to 
apply a broad interpretation of powers in the field of regulatory criminal law; this is evident from 
pre-Lisbon initiatives to submit proposals for regulatory criminal law measures in the policy areas 
of environment protection31, maritime safety32, migration33, and intellectual property 
protection34. While the intellectual property crimes proposal was rejected35, the other proposals 
were adopted36; and two of them eventually brought the European Commission to apply 
successfully for the annulment of corresponding Framework Decisions in the famous 
Environment and Ship-Source Pollution cases.37 A 2011 Communication of the Commission on EU 
criminal policy confirms that a broad interpretation of regulatory criminal law competences is 
                                                          
in favour of a (then) Community’s criminalisation competence if essential for the enforcement of EU policy. See, 
amongst others, Weyembergh, supra note 6, at 16; Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 117.   
31 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law, COM(2007) 51 final. The proposal was based on former Article 175(1) TEC, 
which corresponds to Article 192 TFEU.  
32 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (amending Directive 
2005/35/EC) on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, COM(2008) 134 final. 
This proposal was based on former Article 80(2) TEC which corresponds to Article 100(2) TFEU. 
33 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for 
sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, COM(2007), 249 final. This proposal was 
based on former Article 63(3) sub b TEC, which corresponds to Article 79 TFEU. 
34 European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, COM(2006) 168 final. This 
proposal was based on former Article 95 TEC which corresponds to Article 114 TFEU.   
35 The proposal was mentioned on the list of proposals withdrawn, 2010 O.J. (C 252/9).  
36 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ 2008, 
L 328/28, see Articles 3 and 4 in particular; Directive 2009/123/EC of 21 October 2009 amending Directive 
2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ 2009, L 280/52, see 
Article 1(5) in particular; and Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions 
and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ 2009, L 168/24, see Article 9 in 
particular. 
37 Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542 (Environment Case); Commission v. Council, Case C-
440/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:625 (Ship-Source Pollution Case). 
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also advocated under the heading of Article 83(2) TFEU.38 In addition to the often-heard areas of 
financial market integrity (e.g. to fight market abuse and insider dealing), EU-fraud39 and euro-
counterfeiting40, the Commission expressly sets out to reflect on the potential role of criminal 
law in a number of harmonised policy areas (some of which have not been mentioned before in 
the context of criminal law), namely: road transport, data protection, customs rules, 
environmental protection, fisheries policy and internal market policies (e.g. to fight 
counterfeiting and corruption).  
 
The Commission’s intention to classify a wide range of areas under the scope of Article 83(2) 
TFEU produces uncertainty on the use of this provision in practice. Whether the wording of 
Article 83(2) TFEU itself can serve as a limit on the exercise of EU competences in the policy areas 
mentioned above is rather doubtful – despite the fact that its wording does suggest high 
thresholds for EU action. A first significant restriction on the exercise of EU powers could be read 
into the provision’s requirement that in the area concerned harmonisation has previously taken 
place (harmonisation requirement). However, commentators differ on whether this implies a 
minimum degree of harmonisation, or whether any degree of harmonisation fulfills the 
requirement. Whereas, for instance, Peers argues that “there is nothing in the current legal 
framework of the Treaty of Lisbon that requires full harmonization as a pre-condition”41, Öberg 
states that previous harmonisation must at least be “substantive harmonisation”, or, in the words 
of Asp, harmonisation “of a certain quality”.42 On the basis of general definitions of 
harmonisation elsewhere in the treaties, Öberg, following Asp, concludes that “the underlying 
                                                          
38 European Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of 
EU policies through criminal law, COM(2011) 573 final, 9–11 in particular (presenting the European Commission’s 
framework for the further development of a criminal policy under the Treaty of Lisbon). 
39 Even though the Commission’s statements with regard to a criminal law competence under Article 325(4) TFEU 
strongly suggests that its mentioning of EU-fraud refers to this provision, rather than to Article 83(2) TFEU, id. at 6. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the Commission’s proposal for a Directive in this area is based on Article 325(4) 
TFEU): European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, COM(2012) 363 final.  
40 The mentioning of this area surprises as it concerns one of the expressly enumerated areas of Article 83(1) TFEU, 
supra note 14. 
41 See STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW 775 (2011); see also Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 118.  
42 JACOB ÖBERG, UNION REGULATORY CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCE. SCOPE, LIMITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 64 (SIEPS, 2015) 
(discussing the limits of the EU’s regulatory criminal law mandate and developing proposals to improve judicial 
control in this field); Asp, supra note 6, at 135.   
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harmonisation measures must have, as their object, either strengthening the internal market or 
maintaining competition in the common market. Harmonisation, from a qualitative perspective, 
furthermore entails a modification of the substance of internal laws by providing for common 
substantive EU laws in relation to certain policy fields. […] Underlying harmonisation cannot thus 
concern marginal questions or merely superficial harmonisation”.43 Since a definite answer 
cannot be given on the degree of harmonisation that Article 83(2) TFEU requires, it remains to 
be seen whether the harmonisation requirement will serve as a limit on the exercise of regulatory 
criminalisation powers.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned procedural limit of requiring previous harmonisation, Article 
83(2) TFEU contains two substantive limits on the exercise of EU powers.44 Not only does it 
require that the approximating measure contributes to the effective implementation of a 
harmonised Union policy, it also demands that approximation is essential for that aim. Both limits 
come close to the requirements laid down in the Environment case in which the introduction of 
criminal sanctions was permitted on condition that the application of “effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive criminal penalties” would be “essential” for combating serious environmental 
crime.45  
The crucial question is of course how the EU legislature will in practice deal with the barriers that 
have been put by introducing the requirement of effective implementation as well as by the 
essentiality condition. Will they truly serve as limits on the exercise of the EU’s criminal law 
powers? The past suggests not. I recollect the activist attitude of the European Commission in 
the pre-Lisbon era, mainly reflected in its wide use of criminal law competences, and for the most 
part positively responded to by the legislature. Such a wide application of powers is also 
supported by the European Commission under the current legal framework of the Lisbon treaties; 
                                                          
43 Öberg, supra note 42, at 64. 
44 The terms “procedural limit” and “substantive limit” are borrowed from Jacob Öberg, supra note 42, § 3.3.1 at 52 
(“Substantive limitations on the exercise of Union competence under Article 83(2) TFEU”) and accompanying text, 
and § 3.3.2 at 61 (“This subsection of the chapter considers one of the procedural limits to the exercise of EU 
competences under Article 83(2) TFEU…”) and accompanying text. 
45 Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542, ¶¶ 47-48.   
 
This is a working article. The final version of this article will appear in 23 Colum. J. Eur. L (2017). 
this follows from the aforementioned large number or policy areas that is considered to qualify 
for EU action under the heading of Article 83(2) TFEU.  
Moreover, the single directive that so far has been adopted on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU 
demonstrates significant weaknesses in arguing why criminal law measures are essential for the 
effective implementation of a harmonised Union policy, in this case EU market abuse law. 
Directive 2014/57/EU inter alia entails obligations for the Member States to criminalise in their 
national laws the intentional commission of insider trading, market manipulation, unlawful 
disclosure of inside information, and also inciting, and aiding and abetting to these offences as 
well as, to a certain degree, attempts to insider dealing and market manipulation.46 Particularly 
weak is the Commission’s reasoning that criminal sanctions are essential to effectively implement 
the EU’s policy to prevent and fight market abuse. It appears that the essential nature of the 
proposed criminal law measures is based on their capability to improve deterrence. According to 
the Commission, the expected increase of deterrence would follow from: a) the social 
disapproval that criminal sanctions do demonstrate; b) the widespread media attention that 
often accompanies criminal convictions in this field; c) the reduction of divergences between the 
national criminal laws of Member States, which would reduce the scope for potential offenders 
to carry out market abuse offences in Member States with more lenient provisions and sanctions; 
and d) the facilitation of transnational cooperation.47  
In its reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No. 2, the German Bundesrat sharply criticized 
parts of the Commission’s reasoning concerning the essentiality of criminal law measures in the 
sense of Article 83(2) TFEU. It pointed out that the essentiality condition can neither be 
considered satisfied by the mere argument that criminal sanctions in this area “could contribute 
to overcoming a problem or could have a positive impact on attaining a goal does not constitute 
                                                          
46 Parliament and Council Directive 2014/57/EU, on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive), 
Articles 3-7, 2014 O.J. (L 173/179).  
47 See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, Explanatory Memorandum at 2-3, COM(2011) 654 final; 
Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market 
abuse) and the Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, 
particularly §§ 3.2.3 and 8.1.4.4 (SEC(2011) 1217 final); Parliament and Council Directive 2014/57/EU, supra note 
46, at Preamble, Recitals 6-8. 
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a substantiation of the essential nature of such measures”48, nor by the mere theoretical 
consideration that perpetrators might move to Member States with more lenient criminal laws 
to engage in market abuse offences.49 Academics have also passed criticism on the tenability of 
arguments that have been put forward to support the essential nature of criminal law measures 
in this field. Observations that the alleged essentiality of such measures lacks sufficient evidence 
in the proposal and impact assessment50 naturally follow from the Bundesrat’s remark that mere 
arguments and considerations on deterrent effect cannot suffice to comply with the essentiality 
condition of Article 83(2) TFEU.  
 
In common with Article 83(1) TFEU, the criminalisation competence of Article 83(2) TFEU is 
neither restricted to completed criminal offences only, nor to the actual commission of 
prohibited acts; it has become quite common that EU-level criminal prohibitions also cover 
attempts51 and preparatory acts as well as the aiding or abetting in the commission of a crime. 
Needless to say that such a use of Article 83(2) TFEU may significantly stretch the boundaries of 
criminalisation competences in the EU. 
 
                                                          
48 Reasoned opinion by the Bundesrat of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, available 
at the European Parliament’s archive, PE478.632v01-00, 3 (submitted under Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 6, 2010, O.J. (C 83/206); stating why it 
considers that the proposal does not comply with the subsidiarity principle). The Bundesrat might well have alluded 
to the wide use of “could” and “can” in the legislative documents. See for instance the Impact Assessment, supra 
note 47, at 27 (“Since market abuse can be carried out across borders, this divergence (i.e. divergence in the criminal 
or non-criminal approach towards market abuse throughout the Member States, JO) can be expected to have 
negative effects on the single market and could encourage potential offenders to carry out market abuse in Member 
States which have the least strict sanctions”) (italics added); see also at 168 (“The increased deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions for the most serious offences could be expected to result in greater market integrity and a 
reduction in the losses suffered by investors due to market abuse”) (italics added).  
49 Reasoned opinion by the Bundesrat of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 48, at 3.  
50 See Marta Miglietti, The New EU Criminal Law Competence in Action: The Proposal for a Directive on Criminal 
Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation, IES WORKING PAPER SERIES, 26-32 (5/2013) (analyzing the first 
proposed directive under Article 83(2) TFEU, i.e. the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, supra note 46); See also Öberg, supra 
note 42, at 56-61. Asp, though, is of the opinion that requiring “hard empirical data” to support the essentiality of 
criminal law measures would be unrealistic, supra note 6, at 131.  
51 In her analysis of the legal framework on market abuse, Herlin-Karnell has pointed out that due to a lack of clarity 
as to the boundaries of attempt, the national delineation of prohibited attempts may lead to divergence in the 
application of EU measures, see supra note 16, at 490-491.  
 
This is a working article. The final version of this article will appear in 23 Colum. J. Eur. L (2017). 
The foregoing indicates that Article 83(2) TFEU is likely to be interpreted as providing a broad 
competence to criminalise conduct EU-wide. But outside the express competence laid down in 
Article 83(2), the TFEU contains several other potential legal bases to underpin the adoption of 
criminal law prohibitions in the field of regulatory criminal law.  
 
2. Article 325(4) TFEU: Criminalisation in the Field of EU-Fraud 
 
Article 325(4) TFEU has often been mentioned in this regard.52 Article 325 TFEU generally 
envisages the adoption of measures to counter EU-fraud. For that specific aim, the fourth 
paragraph allows the adoption of “necessary measures” in order to afford “effective and 
equivalent protection in the Member States and in all the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies”.53 Contrary to its predecessor provision Article 280(4) TEC – which in its final sentence 
did exclude the adoption of criminal law provisions54 – the “necessary measures” of Article 325(4) 
TFEU are considered to include the enactment of criminal law provisions55; the removal of Article 
                                                          
52 According to Mitsilegas, Article 86 TFEU also provides an alternative legal basis to enact criminal law provisions in 
the field of EU-fraud. Article 86 TFEU enables the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office in order to 
effectively combat fraud offences against the EU’s financial interests. Mitsilegas suggests that the power to adopt 
EU-level definitions of fraud offences can be derived from the wording of Article 86(2) TFEU that “[t]he European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment […] the 
perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union’s financial interests, as determined by the regulation 
provided for in paragraph 1” (italics added). He admits that the application of such criminal law provisions would be 
restricted to exercising the tasks of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), with the consequence that EU-
fraud related norms adopted under the heading of Article 83(2) TFEU or Article 325(4) TFEU would apply outside the 
EPPO context. See Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 120. In the framework of this paper, Article 86 TFEU will not explicitly 
be mentioned as a potential legal basis for EU-level criminalisation of conduct. The reason is, that I consider it highly 
unlikely that Article 86 TFEU can be considered a legal basis to create substantive criminal law norms. In my view, 
the phrase “as determined by the regulation provided for in paragraph 1” does not refer to defining the offences 
that should be covered by the regulation, rather to the very determination of which offences will fall into the future 
EPPO’s jurisdiction.  
53 See Article 325(4) TFEU (“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the 
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union with a view to affording effective 
and equivalent protection in the Member States and in all the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies”). 
54 The last sentence of former Article 280(4) TFEU reads as follows: “These measures shall not concern the application 
of national criminal law or the national administration of justice”. 
55 For instance by the European Commission, as follows from European Commission Communication, Towards an EU 
Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law, COM(2011) 573 final, at 
6 (under the heading ‘Scope for EU Criminal Law’).  
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280(4) TEC’s reservation concerning criminal law has by several scholars been interpreted as the 
conferral of criminal law competences in the field of EU-fraud.56  
 
It is true that EU-level criminal prohibitions could also be categorized under the scope of Article 
83(2) TFEU since fraud against the EU-budget concerns an area in which harmonisation has 
previously taken place. However, compared to the express competence of Article 83(2) TFEU, 
which is restricted to minimum rules by means of directives only, Article 325(4) TFEU generates 
a wider competence; besides the enactment of not directly applicable minimum rules, it also 
allows for the adoption of directly applicable regulations. Opinions differ on the relationship 
between Article 83(2) TFEU and 325(4) TFEU, but the Commission apparently holds the opinion 
that Article 325(4) TFEU is a lex specialis of Article 83(2) TFEU: the 2012 Commission’s proposal 
to adopt EU-level criminal prohibitions regarding serious types of EU-fraud and related conduct 
is based on Article 325(4) TFEU.57  
 
3. Articles 33, 79, 91, 103, 114 and 192 TFEU: Criminalisation Competences in the Areas of 
Customs Law, Illegal Immigration, Transport Law, Competition and Taxation Law, and 
Environmental Law  
 
Attention has also been drawn to a number of other provisions that, like Articles 325(4) and 86 
TFEU, relate to a very specific area of competence. It concerns Article 33 TFEU on customs law, 
Article 79 TFEU on immigration policy, Article 91 TFEU on transport law, Article 114 TFEU on 
competition and taxation law, Article 103 TFEU on competition law, and Article 192 on 
environmental protection.  
 
With regard to Article 33 TFEU, Satzger, for instance, holds the view that the deletion of the pre-
Lisbon reservation of former Article 135 TEC (which equally to the abovementioned reservation 
                                                          
56 Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 119; Satzger, supra note 28, at 55-56, 81; See also Asp, supra note 6, at 142-154, who 
concludes that Article 325(4) TFEU does provide a legal basis, though a legal basis that must be applied in 
combination with the application of Article 83(2) TFEU.  
57 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight against 
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, COM(2012) 363 final. 
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in former Article 280(4) TFEU58 excluded the creation of criminal law) means that the adoption 
of supranational criminal law provisions is no longer excluded in the area of protecting the 
customs union.59 Satzger’s view is disputed by Asp, who points out that Article 33 merely refers 
to measures “in order to strengthen custom cooperation between Member States and between 
the latter and the Commission” (italics added).60 Asp convincingly argues that this phrase cannot 
be interpreted as including the creation of EU-level norms of substantive criminal law.61   
An attentive reader may remember that the European Commission in its 2011 Communication 
on EU Criminal Policy has listed “customs rules” as a harmonised policy area that would qualify 
for action under the heading of Article 83(2) TFEU.62 This could be considered an argument 
against interpreting Article 33 TFEU as conferring criminalisation powers upon the EU. At the 
same time, however, parallel criminalisation competences have been recognized in other areas 
of crime. Time will tell if the Commission regards Article 33 as a sufficient legal basis to underpin 
EU-wide criminal prohibitions in the area of customs.  
 
Views also diverge with regard to Articles 91, 103, 114 and 192 TFEU. Article 114 TFEU, to start 
with, envisages the adoption of approximating measures for the achievement of establishing or 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market in accordance with Article 26 TFEU.63 As appears 
from a 2006 proposal for a directive in the area of intellectual property protection, the 
Commission considers Article 114 TFEU to constitute a proper legal basis for the harmonisation 
of EU regulatory criminal law: the draft directive proposed to oblige the Member States to 
                                                          
58 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
59 Satzger, supra note 28, at 55-56. See also SAMULI MIETTINEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 86-87 
(2013) (assessing the development of EU criminal law and arguing that the removal of the former limit with regard 
to criminal law measures makes it “not inconceivable” that criminal law regulations could be created in the field of 
customs).   
60 See Article 33 TFEU (“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall take measures in order to strengthen customs 
cooperation between Member States and between the latter and the Commission”).  
61 Asp, supra note 6, at 160-161.  
62 See European Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation 
of EU policies through criminal law, COM(2011) 573 final. 
63 See Article 114(1) TFEU (“Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for 
the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council, shall…adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market”).  
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criminalise in their national laws “all intentional infringements of an intellectual property right 
on a commercial scale, and attempting, aiding or abetting and inciting such infringements” (draft 
Article 3).64 Notwithstanding the fact that this very proposal was rejected65, the Commission’s 
view that Article 114 TFEU does allow for the harmonisation of regulatory criminal law has been 
supported by several scholars.66 As evident from the wording of Article 114 TFEU, criminalisation 
adopted under its heading is required to contribute to market integration; the adopted legislation 
must, in other words, demonstrate a link to the internal market. This very requirement has 
brought Herlin-Karnell to the position that Article 114 TFEU creates a higher threshold for EU-
level criminalisation than Article 83(2) TFEU which “only” requires previous harmonisation: “an 
interpretation of art. 83(2) TFEU with no threshold at all in terms of market creation will become 
an even lower test than that of art. 114 TFEU”.67  
 
Article 91 TFEU envisages the possibility to enact “any other appropriate provisions” within the 
framework of a common transport policy (Article 91(1)(d) TFEU in conjunction with Article 90 
TFEU).68 According to Satzger, a broad interpretation of this competence leads to the conclusion 
that the enactment of such appropriate provisions “might include criminal provisions in the field 
of traffic law”69, to be adopted either through regulations or through directives.  
 
Article 103 TFEU allows the adoption of regulations or directives for the aim of ensuring 
compliance with EU competition rules as laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 103(2) 
TFEU specifically mentions which matters such regulations and directives may “in particular” deal 
                                                          
64 European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, COM(2006) 168 final. This 
proposal was based on former Article 95 TEC which corresponds to Article 114 TFEU.  
65 See supra note 35. 
66 See amongst others Öberg, supra note 42, at 73; MICHAEL J. FRESE, SANCTIONS IN EU COMPETITION LAW. PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 101 (2014) (examining the implications of decentralizing enforcement competences in the field of EU 
competition law); Herlin-Karnell, supra note 16, at 485-487; Peter Whelan, Contemplating the Future: Personal 
Criminal Sanctions for Infringement of EC Competition Law, in 19 KING’S LAW JOURNAL, 364, 369 (2008) (assessing the 
necessity, appropriateness, and the existence of a legal basis for criminalisation in the field of EC competition law).  
67 Herlin-Karnell, supra note 16, at 485-486.  
68 See Article 91 TFEU (“1. For the purpose of implementing Article 90, and taking into account the distinctive features 
of transport, the European Parliament and the Council shall…lay down:…(d) any other appropriate provisions”).  
69 Satzger, supra note 28, at 54.  
 
This is a working article. The final version of this article will appear in 23 Colum. J. Eur. L (2017). 
with; they may concern, for instance, fines and periodic penalty payments for the imposition of 
unfair trading conditions, which is prohibited in Article 102(a) TFEU).70 Satzger states that the 
term “in particular” suggests a non-exhaustive listing of possible provisions, which means that 
the adoption of criminal law provisions is not excluded.71  
 
Article 192 TFEU, finally, provides for “action […] to be taken by the Union” for the aim of 
achieving the environmental policy objectives set out in Article 191 TFEU (i.e. preserving, 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment; protecting human health, etc.).72 
According to Satzger, it falls into the discretion of the European Parliament and the Council 
whether such “action” should consist in the adoption of criminal law provisions.73  
 
Satzger’s most significant argument for the assumption that unlike their pre-Lisbon equivalents 
(respectively former Articles 71, 83 and 175 TEC), Articles 91, 103 and 192 TFEU do entail criminal 
law competences adds up to the observation that the current treaties, in contrast to the former 
treaties, contain detailed provisions on criminal law without them being placed in a special pillar 
with a deviating decision-making process; as a result, the creation of supranational criminal law 
in the areas of transport law, competition law and environmental law falls within the EU’s 
competence.74 The same conclusion has been drawn by Öberg, though on a more general level 
and therefore with consequences for the interpretation of Article 114 TFEU as well. Öberg 
considers it “unlikely” that Article 83(2) TFEU is intended to exclude criminalisation through 
regulations or criminalisation outside the harmonised policy areas, also in view of the fact that 
the treaties contain “no clear textual indication” to support such a conclusion.75 Most compelling 
in his opinion, however, is the “EU objectives”-driven interpretation of the scope of the EU’s 
                                                          
70 See Article 103 TFEU (“1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 
101 and 102 shall be laid down by the Council…2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
designed in particular: (a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 101(1) and in Article 102 
by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments…”).  
71 Satzger, supra note 28, at 54.  
72 See Article 192 TFEU (“1. The European Parliament and the Council…shall decide what action is to be taken by 
the Union in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191”).  
73 Satzger, supra note 28, at 54. 
74 Id. at 55. 
75 Öberg, supra note 42, at 72.  
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implied criminal law competence; this can be derived from European Court of Justice’s case-law 
in which the implied criminal law competence of the EU is conditioned on the principle of 
effectiveness.76 For the aim of enhancing the effective enforcement of Union policies, 
criminalisation would thus be allowed outside Article 83(2) TFEU77 - for instance under the 
heading of Article 192 TFEU, provided that the criminal prohibitions are effective and essential 
for the enforcement of the EU’s environmental policies.78 With regard to Article 114 TFEU, Öberg 
states that “[i]f the Union is to achieve the objective of creating an internal market and enforce 
those policies effectively, the necessary criminal powers must be placed at the service of the 
Union”.79 
 
Whereas Asp admits that the interpretation as given above is not as such opposed to the wording 
of the TFEU, he is not ready to accept a general competence outside Article 83 TFEU which would 
allow the harmonisation of criminal law by means of either directives, or regulations. His main 
argument is that the acceptance of such a general competence would make it hard to understand 
the restrictions on the application of criminalisation competences, which have been included in 
Article 83 TFEU: “The main reason is that it seems difficult to explain why one would bother to 
provide for so many safeguards and limitations in relation to Article 83 TFEU, if there are more 
extensive competences outside Title V Chapter 4”.80 Asp does, however, accept criminalisation 
powers outside Article 83, or even outside Title V, but only insofar the provision in hand provides 
                                                          
76 Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542 (Environment Case), ¶¶ 47-48 (“47…As a general rule, 
neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community’s competence…48. However, the 
last-mentioned finding does not prevent the Community legislature, when the application of effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating 
serious environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which 
it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully 
effective”); Commission v. Council, Case C-440/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:625 (Ship-Source Pollution Case), ¶ 66 (“Although 
it is true that, as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community’s 
competence … the fact remains that when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious environmental 
offences, the Community legislature may require the Member States to introduce such penalties in order to ensure 
that the rules which it lays down in that field are fully effective (see, to that effect, Case 
C-176/03 Commission v Council, paragraph 48)”) (all italics added). 
77 Öberg, supra note 42, at 73.  
78 Id. at 46-49. 
79 Id. at 73. 
80 Asp, supra note 6, at 163.  
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special reasons to derive the existence of such powers; but such special reasons can in his view 
only be found with regard to Article 325 TFEU on EU-fraud.  
 
As far as I know, Article 79 TFEU has not been considered as a potential legal basis for regulatory 
criminalisation. The provision has been interpreted as providing a legal basis for the adoption of 
criminal prohibitions in the specific area of human trafficking.81 Now, if Article 79 TFEU must be 
understood as laying down a criminal law competence, its implications may surpass the context 
of human trafficking and related offences. After all, for the purpose of developing a common 
immigration policy, Article 79(1) TFEU further mentions enhanced measures to combat “illegal 
immigration”.82 The reference to illegal immigration has already been interpreted to encompass 
a criminalisation competence too; the pre-Lisbon equivalent of Article 79 TFEU (Article 63 TEC) 
has led in 2009 to the adoption of Directive 2009/52/EC which in Article 9 contains an obligation 
for Member States to make the employment of illegally staying third-country nationals a criminal 
offence.83 As stated in the preamble to this directive, employing these people is considered a 
“key pull factor” for illegal immigration; for that reason, “[a]ction against illegal immigration and 
illegal stay should […] include measures to counter that pull factor”.84  
 
4. The Catch-All Provision of Article 352 TFEU: Additional Criminalisation Powers 
 
Finally, attention must be given to the catch-all provision of Article 352 TFEU (not to be confused 
with the aforementioned provision of Article 325 TFEU on EU-fraud) which has also been 
interpreted as to allow the creation of substantive criminal law provisions. While the 
                                                          
81 See Section I.A.2. As indicated, the explicit reference to human trafficking makes it possible that Article 79 TFEU 
provides an alternative legal basis to Article 83(1) TFEU in which human trafficking is amongst the enumerated areas 
of crime. 
82 See Article 79(1) and (2) TFEU (“1. “The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring…the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration…2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the 
European Parliament and the Council…shall adopt measures in the following areas: …(c) illegal immigration and 
unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation”).  
83 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/52/EC, providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures 
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, 2009 O.J. (L 168/24). This directive is based on former 
Article 63(3) sub b TEC, which corresponds to Article 79 TFEU. 
84 Id. at Preamble, Recital 2. 
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aforementioned potential legal bases for regulatory EU-level criminalisation relate to specific 
areas of competences, Article 352 TFEU has been formulated in general terms and confers onto 
the EU the power to act if proved “necessary […] to attain the objectives set out in the Treaties” 
where “the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers” (Article 352(1) TFEU).85 The option 
that this provision would provide an alternative legal basis for EU-wide criminalisation of conduct 
has, however, been contested by Asp. He points out that in comparison with Article 83(2) TFEU, 
Article 352(1) TFEU does not require previous harmonisation in the policy field in which criminal 
law measures are considered desirable; Article 352(1) TFEU thus provides a lower threshold for 
criminalisation than Article 83(2) TFEU. But Asp cannot think of any justification to use Article 
352(1) TFEU instead of Article 83(2) TFEU in cases where harmonisation measures have not (yet) 
been adopted.86  
 
Other commentators, however, do derive from Article 352 TFEU a general, additional, 
criminalisation competence.87 Mitsilegas, for instance, deems it logical to interpret Article 352 
TFEU as enabling the EU legislature to adopt criminal law measures in cases where the 
requirements of Article 83(2) TFEU (in particular the harmonisation requirement) would not have 
been fulfilled; it fits into the Treaty’s endorsement of “functional criminalisation”, in the course 
of which criminalisation must serve the effectiveness of EU law.88 Regardless of which view is 
most convincing, it is worth mentioning that it seems unlikely that in practice the EU legislature 
would take refuge in Article 352 TFEU in order to circumvent the harmonisation requirement of 
Article 83(2) TFEU. After all, the ultimate adoption under the heading of Article 352 TFEU would 
not only require unanimity, it would also demand the UK, Ireland, and Denmark to give up the 
                                                          
85 See Article 352(1) TFEU (“If action should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out it the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures…”).  
86 Asp, supra note 6, at 137-138. See also ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 
87 (2012) (examining the progression of supranational criminal law in the EU and the role of the effectiveness in that 
regard).  
87 See, e.g.,  Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 121; Satzger, supra note 28, at 54.  
88 Mitsilegas, supra note 12, at 121.   
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opt-outs they have negotiated with regard to measures adopted in the framework of the area of 
freedom, security and justice.89  
 
5. DIFFERING REQUIREMENTS UNDER DIFFERENT LEGAL BASES FOR CRIMINALISATION 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, it may fairly be concluded that outside the express criminalisation 
competences of Article 83 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty provides for several ancillary criminalisation 
powers, both inside and outside Title V TFEU on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
In various areas of crime, legal bases for criminalisation overlap, for instance with regard to EU-
fraud: both Article 83(2) and Article 325(4) TFEU are considered to enable the adoption of 
criminal prohibitions.90  
This Part aims to show that the requirements for adopting criminal prohibitions may differ 
notably throughout the parallel legal bases. This can best be demonstrated from the perspective 
of the legal requirements laid down in Article 83 TFEU – and how these differ from what other 
provisions stipulate. The most striking contrasts in procedural requirements will be listed first, 
followed by the most important substantive differences. Subsequently, it will be shown that the 
EU legal framework is unsuitable to counter these diverging requirements for EU-level 
criminalisation.     
 
A. Differing Procedural Requirements  
 
The express criminal law competence envisaged in Article 83 TFEU91 is limited to minimum rules 
in directives, whereas most of the other provisions merely refer to measures (e.g. Articles 325(4), 
79, and Article 114 TFEU), or even more vaguely to action (Article 192).92 That way these other 
provisions clear the path for the adoption of supranational criminal law: the measures and action 
                                                          
89 See also Asp, supra note 6, at 138-139.  
90 See supra Sections I.B.1-2.  
91 See supra notes 14 and 30 for the respective texts of the first and the second paragraph of Article 83 TFEU.  
92 See supra notes 53, 26, 63, and 72 for the respective texts of these provisions. 
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referred to in these provisions may exceed the level of minimum rules, and, moreover, may be 
adopted by means of directly applicable regulations.  
Furthermore, would criminalisation powers be exercised under Articles 103 TFEU, a less onerous 
decision-making process would suffice, since unlike criminalisation on the basis of Article 83 
TFEU, the European Parliament’s consent would not be required.93 It is true that unanimity is 
required for the adoption of criminal prohibitions under the catch-all provision of Article 352 
TFEU94, whereas criminalisation under Article 83 TFEU can be established with a qualified 
majority. But insofar criminal prohibitions under Article 352 TFEU would be established through 
regulations, their effect would as such be more interfering on the national legal order than 
minimum rules through directives would be.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that unlike all other potential legal bases for criminalisation, Article 
83(3) TFEU grants Member States access to the emergency brake procedure: where a Member 
State has serious concerns that a draft directive would affect fundamental aspects of its national 
criminal justice system, it may request the referral of the legislative proposal to the European 
Council. Pending a suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure for a maximum duration of 
four months, the draft directive will be discussed in the European Council. Would this not result 
in a consensus, Article 83(3) TFEU enables a minimum number of nine Member States to establish 
enhanced cooperation.95 This enhanced cooperation would obviously not bind the opposing 
Member States; as such, it enables a single Member State to block EU-wide decision-making in 
the areas covered by Article 83 TFEU. Klip rightly points out that the emergency brake procedure 
                                                          
93 Article 103(1) TFEU merely requires that the Council consults the European Parliament (“…and after consulting 
the European Parliament”).  
94 See supra note 85. 
95 See Article 83(3) TFEU (“Where a member of the Council considers that a draft directive as referred to in paragraph 
1 or 2 would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the draft directive be 
referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure shall be suspended. After 
discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, refer the 
draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure. Within the 
same timeframe, in case of disagreement, and if at least nine Member States wish to establish enhanced cooperation 
on the basis of the draft directive concerned, they shall notify the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission accordingly. In such a case, the authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation referred to in 
Article 20(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 329(1) of this Treaty shall be deemed to be granted and 
the provisions on enhanced cooperation shall apply”).  
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cannot be considered a veto right; it only prevents Member States from being bound by 
legislative measures that it considers a threat to fundamental aspects of national criminal 
justice.96 Though not as powerful as the right to veto, the emergency brake procedure must 
nevertheless be considered an important tool for Member States to express fundamental 
concerns on proposed legislation. Most relevant in the context of this Section is that outside 
Article 83 TFEU, Member States do not have access to the emergency brake procedure or 
something similar in relation to proposed criminalisation.  
 
The choice of legal basis is further relevant because of differing thresholds for subsidiarity 
controls by national parliaments. Pursuant to Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, any national 
parliament may submit a reasoned opinion stating why it considers a legislative proposal contrary 
to the subsidiarity principle.97 Provided that the submitted reasoned opinions represent a 
minimum number of all votes allocated to the national parliaments, the Commission must review 
the proposed legislative act. It strikes that Protocol No. 2 sets different thresholds. Regarding 
proposals submitted under Title V TFEU on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), 
which covers Article 83 TFEU, reasoned opinions must at least represent a quarter of all the votes. 
But in all other cases of proposed EU-level criminal prohibitions, the submission of reasoned 
opinions will only result in a review by the Commission if at least one third of all votes is 
represented.98 As a result, a subsidiarity review can easier be procured in relation to proposed 
criminal prohibitions based on Article 83 TFEU.  
 
B. Differing Substantive Requirements 
                                                          
96 ANDRÉ KLIP, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW. AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 39-40 (3rd ed. 2016).  
97 Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 
6, 2010 O.J. (C 83/206) (“Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may, within eight weeks 
from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act … send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national Parliament or each chamber of a national Parliament to 
consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers…”). 
98 Id. at Article 7 (“Where reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act’s non-compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to the national Parliaments in accordance with the 
second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the draft must be reviewed. This threshold shall be a quarter in the case of a 
draft legislative act submitted on the basis of Article 76 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on 
the area of freedom, security and justice”).  
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A comparison between substantive legal requirements in the various legal bases shows diverse 
differences too. The following presents the most striking ones, first those that follow from a 
comparison between Articles 83(1) and (2) TFEU, then the differences between Articles 83(1) and 
(2) TFEU and their respective concurring legal bases.   
 
1. Article 83(1) TFEU versus Article 83(2) TFEU 
 
Even if Article 83 TFEU would apply exclusively, the fact remains that both paragraphs contain 
differences in substantive legal requirements for the adoption of criminal prohibitions. These 
differences concern the cross-border requirement, the harmonisation requirement, and the 
essentiality condition.99  
It follows from the first paragraph of Article 83 TFEU that action in the enumerated areas of crime 
is allowed insofar as the conduct at stake has a cross-border dimension. This condition has not 
been included in the second paragraph of Article 83 TFEU. In its turn, this latter paragraph’s 
requirement of previous harmonisation has not been included in the first paragraph. There may 
be obvious reasons for including the harmonisation requirement in Article 83(2) TFEU contrary 
to Article 83(1) TFEU; after all, it goes without saying that the areas of crime covered by Article 
83(1) TFEU – terrorism, human trafficking, money laundering, etc. – differ in nature from the 
crime areas that qualify for action under the heading of Article 83(2) TFEU – environmental crime, 
insider dealing, et cetera.100 With regard to these crime categories, it seems reasonable to 
demand the additional requirement of previous harmonisation before being able to opt for an 
EU-level criminal law approach. For the difference concerning the cross-border requirement, 
however, such an obvious explanation is absent. One could argue that the harmonised policy 
areas of Article 83(2) TFEU have a cross-border dimension as such, simply because it concerns 
areas in which EU-wide measures have been adopted. But such an argument cannot be 
                                                          
99 See supra Sections I.A.1 and I.B.1.  
100 Clearly expressed by the terms “securitised criminalisation” versus “functional criminalisation”, cf. Mitsilegas, 
supra note 12.  
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considered very convincing; the very existence of EU-level rules does not suffice to demonstrate 
that a specific type of conduct crosses internal borders in the sense of Article 83(1) TFEU.  
In comparing the substantive legal requirements of both paragraphs of Article 83 TFEU, it is also 
worth to mention the so-called essentiality condition laid down in Article 83(2) TFEU: 
harmonisation of definitions of offences must be essential for the effective implementation of an 
already harmonised policy area. This contrasts with Article 83(1) TFEU. Although it is true that 
Article 83(1) TFEU does mention “a special need” for EU action, close reading suggests that such 
a special need does not constitute an imperative for harmonisation; it may bear the conclusion 
that the offences at stake have a cross-border dimension, but this cross-border dimension may 
also result from their “nature or impact”.  
 
2. Article 83 TFEU versus Other Legal Bases for Criminalisation  
 
A general distinction between Article 83 TFEU versus other potential legal bases for 
criminalisation exists in the territorial scope of legislation. In the AFSJ context, which covers 
criminalisation under Article 83 TFEU, harmonised measures are likely to have a narrower 
territorial scope than outside the AFSJ context. This stems from the fact that three Member 
States (the UK, Ireland, and Denmark) have negotiated special arrangements – so-called opt-outs 
– which allow them to decide not to participate in Title V TFEU measures, so including 
criminalisation measures.101 These opt-outs cannot be invoked outside the AFSJ context; criminal 
prohibitions adopted outside Article 83 TFEU are therefore likely to have a broader territorial 
scope.  
 
 
3. Article 83(1) TFEU versus Concurring Legal Bases 
 
                                                          
101 Protocol No. 21 to the Lisbon Treaty, on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, 2010 O.J. (C 83/295); Protocol No. 22 to the Lisbon Treaty, on the position of 
Denmark, 2010 O.J. (C 83/299). A recent referendum on ending the Danish opt-out clause has been rejected in 2015, 
see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35002158 (last accessed on July 13, 2016). On the background of 
these protocols, see generally Peers, supra note 41, at 73 et seq.  
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With regard to the EU’s criminalisation powers in specific areas of crime102, it has been shown 
that Article 83(1) TFEU envisages an explicit competence to design criminal prohibitions in 
expressly enumerated areas of crime, among which human trafficking.103 In this specific area, 
however, EU-wide definitions of offences may also be adopted on the basis of Article 79 TFEU.104 
Criminalisation competences thus overlap with regard to human trafficking.  
A comparison between both provisions reveals that unlike Article 79 TFEU, Article 83(1) TFEU 
requires a cross-border dimension: To enact criminal prohibitions under the heading of Article 
83(1) TFEU, the EU legislature must demonstrate a cross-border dimension of the conduct, either 
as the result of its nature or impact, or from a special need to combat it on a common basis.105 
Article 79(1) and (2) TFEU, in contrast, does not include such a concrete prerequisite at all; the 
verbatim text merely stipulates that the adopted measures contribute to developing a common 
immigration policy, more specifically to the prevention and combat of trafficking in human 
beings.106 As follows from the text of Article 79(1) and (2)(d) TFEU, criminal prohibitions in the 
field of “combating trafficking in persons” must be adopted for the purposes of “ensuring […] the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, […] trafficking in human beings” (Article 79(1) 
TFEU) – this is what I would call a circular reasoning.  
One may wonder if the lack of the cross-border requirement in Article 79 TFEU would have 
consequences in practice, in the sense that Article 79 TFEU sets a lower threshold for 
criminalisation than Article 83(1) TFEU. Does the cross-border dimension not automatically result 
from the nature or impact of offences such as human trafficking? Not necessarily. The term 
human trafficking covers exploitation of people in a broad sense, irrespective of whether a 
person has been transferred from one Member State to another.107 It can therefore be concluded 
                                                          
102 See supra Section I.A.  
103 See supra Section I.A.1. 
104 See supra Section I.A.2.  
105 See Article 83(1) TFEU, supra note 14. 
106 See Article 79 TFEU, supra note 26. 
107 This follows from the definition of human trafficking in Parliament and Council Directive 2011/36/EU, on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA, Article 2, 2011 O.J. (L101/6) (“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position 
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”). This directive has been adopted on the basis of Article 83(1) 
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that the adoption of criminal prohibitions has to meet more stringent requirements under Article 
83(1) TFEU than under Article 79 TFEU.  
 
4. Article 83(2) TFEU versus Concurring Legal Bases 
 
The landscape of regulatory criminalisation powers is rather fragmented, simply because of the 
number of potential legal bases for criminalisation outside the explicit competence laid down in 
Article 83(2) TFEU.108  
 
A first prerequisite that distinguishes Article 83(2) TFEU from the other provisions concerns the 
so-called harmonisation requirement. While it is true that commentators differ on the degree of 
harmonisation that Article 83(2) TFEU calls for,109 it is clear from the outset that the condition of 
underlying harmonisation is at least meant to limit the criminal law competence laid down in this 
provision; the requirement could however be circumvented if criminal prohibitions were based 
on another Treaty provision since none of these require previous harmonisation in the area 
concerned.  
In relation to the harmonisation requirement, Article 83(2) TFEU further stipulates that measures 
adopted under its heading contribute to the effective implementation of harmonisation 
measures previously adopted in the area concerned. Because this effectiveness criterion relates 
to the requirement of previous harmonisation, it seems hardly comparable to effectiveness 
criteria in other provisions. Article 325(4) TFEU, for instance, requires that measures serve the 
“effective and equivalent protection” against EU-fraud in all Member States, institutions, 
agencies, bodies and offices (italics added) – but the object of effectiveness is not necessarily the 
implementation of previous harmonisation measures in the field of EU-fraud.110 A similar 
situation arises under Article 192(1) TFEU which merely determines that action must serve to 
                                                          
TFEU, although one could question thus whether the cross-border requirement has been fulfilled with regard to all 
types of criminalised conduct.  
108 See supra Section I.B.  
109 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.  
110 See supra Section I.B.2. 
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achieve the environmental policy objectives of Article 191 TFEU; that harmonisation measures 
have previously been adopted in this field is not explicitly required.111  
It must be admitted that both policy areas – the protection of the EU’s financial interests and 
environmental policy – have largely been harmonised, so that the practical value of the 
aforementioned differences between Article 83 TFEU on the one hand, and Articles 325(4) and 
192 TFEU on the other hand might be very little. Yet in relation to Article 114 TFEU the question 
arises if the lack of a harmonisation requirement in Article 114 TFEU would actually make it easier 
for the EU legislature to establish EU-level criminal prohibitions. As argued by Herlin-Karnell, this 
question should be answered in the negative.112 She holds the view that the specific prerequisite 
of Article 114 that measures must contribute to market integration, means a higher threshold for 
criminalisation. In her view, the mere requirement of previous harmonisation de facto covers 
much more areas than market integration alone “since there is not much in contemporary EU 
law that has not already been the subject of some kind of harmonisation by the European 
Union”.113  
 
The so-called “essentiality condition” of Article 83(2) TFEU is also worth comparing; it stipulates 
that the adoption of criminal prohibitions is “essential” to ensure a well-defined aim, i.e. the 
effective implementation of the underlying harmonisation measures. The requirement of 
essentiality boils down to a requirement of necessity. Necessity conditions have also been laid 
down in Articles 325(4) TFEU (“necessary measures”) and 352 TFEU (“If action […] should prove 
necessary”). Equal to what has been argued with regard to the effectiveness criterion, it should 
be stressed that the object of necessity can reach beyond underlying harmonisation measures in 
the field: Article 325(4) TFEU only requires that measures are necessary “with a view to affording 
effective and equivalent protection” against EU-fraud; and Article 352 TFEU generally indicates 
“one of the objectives set out in the Treaties” as the object of necessity.114  
                                                          
111 See supra Section I.B.3. 
112 See supra Section I.B.3. 
113 Herlin-Karnell, supra note 16, at 485.  
114 See supra Section I.B.2 and Section I.B.4 respectively. 
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The remaining potential legal bases for criminalisation do not explicitly demand the necessity of 
EU-level criminal prohibitions. Articles 91 and 103 TFEU require that legislative measures are 
“appropriate”,115 but semantically this cannot be considered to stipulate the necessity of those 
measures.  
 
Not yet mentioned in this Section are Articles 33 and 79 TFEU, for these provisions do not 
stipulate any substantive requirements for the adoption of measures. Article 33 TFEU only states 
that measures must serve the strengthening of customs cooperation between Member States 
mutually and between Member States and the Commission.116 Article 79 TFEU merely stipulates 
that the adopted measures contribute to developing a common immigration policy, more 
specifically to the prevention and combat of illegal immigration.117  
 
C. The Insufficient Counterbalancing Capacity of the Current Legal Framework 
 
Now that the procedural and substantive differences in requirements for criminalisation under 
the various legal bases have been presented, one could well wonder if the EU legal framework 
itself already holds several instruments to counter the effects of diverging criminalisation 
requirements. In this regard, it seems obvious to firstly point out that the exercise of 
competences by the EU is legally governed by the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Would these principles guarantee that – in any case to a significant extent – 
equal requirements de facto apply for the adoption of EU-level criminal prohibitions? A second 
issue that could be raised relates to the hierarchy of powers. Does the Court’s case-law on choices 
of legal bases suffice to prevent the EU legislature from selecting the favorable provision in terms 
of procedural and/or substantive requirements for criminalisation? As explained below, both 
questions must unfortunately be answered in the negative. 
 
 
                                                          
115 See notes 68 and 70 for the texts of these respective provisions. 
116 See Article 33 TFEU, supra note 60.   
117 See Article 79 TFEU, supra note 82. 
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1. The Limited Role of Limiting Principles: Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
 
It is true that the Lisbon Treaty itself defines the legitimate scope of EU powers and how they 
should be exercised: Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union118 (hereinafter TEU) encompasses 
the governing principles. It starts with the principle that the European Union has only the powers 
conferred upon it; other powers remain with the Member States.119 If under this principle of 
conferral the EU is as such competent to act, the principle of subsidiarity determines whether 
the EU should act, that is “only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States […], but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects 
of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level”.120 The principle of proportionality 
addresses the “how-question” of proposed action; it must be ensured that the content and form 
of a measure does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.121 
The Court of Justice contributes to containing the exercise of competences; under Articles 263 
and 264 TFEU, the Court is empowered to annul legislation that infringes the principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity or proportionality.122  
A first reason why the above system of defining and governing the EU’s competences must be 
considered insufficient to counter the undesirable consequences of diverging conditions for EU-
level criminalisation, is that they do not fully cover, not even collectively, the most stringent 
requirements that have been found in the relevant Treaty provisions.123 Although the opposite 
                                                          
118 Treaty on European Union, Dec. 26 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/13) [hereinafter TEU]. 
119 See Article 5(2) TEU (“Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”).  
120 See Article 5(3) TEU (“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level…”).  
121 See Article 5(4) TEU (“Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties…”).  
122 See Article 263 TFEU (“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts…It 
shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council 
or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers…”) and Article 
264 TFEU (“If the action is well founded, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall declare the act concerned 
to be void…”).  
123 See for these various requirements supra Part II.  
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might have seemed the case at a first reading of these beautifully formulated principles, a closer 
look at the meaning of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality demonstrates that most 
divergences remain to exist. This is demonstrated below, first with regard to subsidiarity, then 
with regard to proportionality. 
 
The role of subsidiarity in restraining the exercise of EU powers 
Before reviewing the concrete content of the subsidiarity principle, it is important to remind 
ourselves of the fact that this principle does not apply in areas in which the EU has exclusive 
competence (Article 5(3) TEU). Although it is true that very few areas come under exclusive EU 
competence, the fact that subsidiarity does not apply in these areas could be relevant where EU-
level criminal prohibitions are adopted on the basis of Article 103 TFEU. As argued before, it must 
be considered very plausible that this provision allows the adoption of criminal law provisions – 
through regulations or directives – for the aim of ensuring compliance with EU competition 
rules.124 Because the establishment of competition rules which are necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market is an exclusive competence of the European Union125, the use of 
criminalisation powers under the heading of Article 103 TFEU is not restricted by subsidiarity 
concerns. This means that divergent requirements always remain to exist between Article 103 
TFEU and other legal bases for criminalisation, even if subsidiarity would be concluded to cover 
the most stringent requirements for EU-level criminalisation of conduct.  
Apart from Article 103 TFEU, however, it remains relevant to have a closer look at the meaning 
of subsidiarity. It follows from Article 5(3) TEU that the principle of subsidiarity demands, firstly, 
that the objective of the proposed measure cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member 
States’ level, and, secondly, can be better achieved at the EU level.126 If these requirements are 
not met, the EU must refrain from action. As such, the subsidiarity principle aims to determine 
whether the EU should act at all. In the framework of this paper, the question therefore arises 
whether and to what extent both aspects of the subsidiarity principle actually cover the most 
                                                          
124 See supra Section I.B.3.  
125 This follows from Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
126 See Article 5(3) TFEU, supra note 120. 
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stringent substantive legal requirements that have been found in the Treaty competences for 
criminalisation.  
As follows from the previous analysis, these most stringent requirements are to be found in 
Article 83 TFEU.127 It has been demonstrated that Article 83(1) TFEU requires a cross-border 
dimension whereas other potential legal bases for criminalisation in the same areas of crime (so-
called Euro-crimes) as well as for regulatory criminalisation lack such a requirement. Moreover, 
Article 83(2) TFEU stipulates that regulatory criminalisation powers can only be invoked provided 
that the harmonisation requirement and the essentiality/necessity condition are fulfilled. 
Previous harmonisation is however not required under other relevant Treaty provisions. And the 
requirement of essentiality can be found in some of them, although the objects of necessity do 
vary: whereas Article 83(2) TFEU requires that criminal prohibitions are essential for the effective 
implementation of underlying harmonisation measures in EU policy areas, Article 325(4) TFEU 
stipulates that criminal prohibitions under its heading are necessary for the aim of affording 
effective and equivalent protection against EU-fraud, whereas Article 352 TFEU generally 
indicates Treaty objectives as the object of necessity.  
In order to determine whether and to what extent these requirements form part of the 
subsidiarity test anyhow, it would be obvious to focus a little bit more on the concrete substance 
of the principle under consideration. This, however, appears not an easy task, in particular 
because neither the legislature nor the European Court of Justice apply substantive criteria in 
order to check compliance with the subsidiarity principle – although such criteria were 
formulated in the so-called Edinburgh Guidelines. These Guidelines were adopted by the 
European Council in Edinburgh in 1992 and later on codified by means of Protocol No. 30 to the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty.128 The Edinburgh Guidelines envisage that in assessing whether the EU 
should act (subsidiarity), the EU legislature must examine three aspects:  
 
- the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by 
action by Member States; and/or 
                                                          
127 See supra Section II.B.  
128 Protocol No. 30 annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 
October 1997, on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 1997 O.J. (C 340/105). 
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- actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the requirements of 
the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade 
or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise significantly damage Member States’ 
interests; and/or 
- The Council must be satisfied that action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of 
its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States.129  
 
These substantive criteria for subsidiarity have not been reproduced in the current protocol on 
subsidiarity and proportionality, i.e. Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty.130 But already previous 
to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Edinburgh Guidelines have never been applied 
by the European Court of Justice. Many commentators have noted that the Court’s review of 
subsidiarity has not been very meaningful at all.131 The Court appears satisfied when the 
preamble contains general statements on the objective of the measure and the need for EU 
action, without requiring a thorough justification for the need to pursue the said objective, and 
without requiring quantitative or qualitative evidence132 to underpin the conclusion that the 
objective can be better achieved at the EU level and cannot be sufficiently achieved at the 
                                                          
129 European Council, Conclusions adopted at Edinburg European Council, in Annex I to Part A, p. 19, Dec. 12, 1992, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/default_en.htm. 
130 Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 2010 
O.J. (C 83/206). 
131 See, e.g.,  Gabriël A. Moens & John Trone, The Principle of Subsidiarity in EU Judicial and Legislative Practice: 
Panacea or Placebo? 41 JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION, 65-102 (2015) (explaining the failure of subsidiarity as a judicial review 
principle and showing the potential of subsidiarity as a legislative principle); Stephen Weatherill, The Limits of 
Legislative Harmonisation Ten Years After Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting 
Guide”, 12 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 828-864 (2011) (demonstrating that the Treaty’s imprecise definition of the EU’s 
legislative competence vests a wide discretion in the legislative institutions, and arguing that against that 
background the Court’s case-law has been converted into a drafting guide, on the basis of which the legislative 
institutions may adopt a given ‘formula’ that the Court can only approve); Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong 
Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW, 63-84 (2006) (stating that the principle 
of subsidiarity is ill-suited to operate as a constraint on Community powers and underlining that the proportionality 
principle is better equipped to solve competence questions); Grainne de Búrca, Reappraising Subsidiarity’s 
Significance after Amsterdam, HARVARD JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER SERIES (7/1999), available at 
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/99/990701.html (arguing the importance of identifying criteria for 
assessing the appropriateness of decision-making through the subsidiarity principle and examining the potential of 
Protocol No. 30 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty (see supra note 128) in that regard).    
132 Despite the fact that such evidence is required on the basis of Article 5 of Protocol No. 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, 
supra note 130.  
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national level.133 It has therefore been concluded that the subsidiarity principle is “under-
enforced”.134  
Several reasons have been given to explain why the judicial enforcement of such a fundamental 
principle has been so weak. It has, for instance, been argued that the under-enforcement of 
subsidiarity by the Court of Justice has been so anemic because it concerns a political question, 
rather than a legal question. The subsidiarity judgment should therefore be made by the political 
institutions of the EU, and does not, or only marginally, qualify for judicial enforcement by the 
Court.135  
Another, much more convincing, reason for the weakness of subsidiarity as a limiting principle 
may be its weak legal content. It has been argued that subsidiarity is ill-suited for its task to 
provide a method for competence division. Instead of being a mechanism by means of which the 
(competing) interests of the Union and its Member States could be carefully balanced – which 
would include the prioritizing of objectives to be achieved – subsidiarity presumes a priori the 
Treaty objectives as well as the need to achieve these objectives, and only asks if these goals are 
going to be achieved by Union action or by the Member States.136 In a context in which the 
justification of EU action is predominantly defined in terms of goals to be achieved, neither 
                                                          
133 See United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-84/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:431, ¶¶ 74-77; Germany v. European Parliament 
and Council (Re Deposit Guarantee Directive), Case C-233/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:231, ¶¶ 26-28; Commission v. 
Germany, Case C-518/07, ECLI:EU:C:2010:125 ¶¶ 21-25, 54-55; Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council, 
Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523, ¶ 33. In R. v. Secretary of State (Re Vodafone Ltd.), Case C-58/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:321, the Court indirectly referred to the impact assessment for its subsidiarity review of a specific 
recital, see ¶¶ 77-79. Vandenbruwaene considers this an important improvement of the Court’s subsidiarity review, 
because impact assessments could be “a veritable tool for dialogue in judicial proceedings”, see Werner 
VandenBruwaene, What Scope for Subnational Autonomy: The Issue of the Legal Enforcement of the Principle of 
Subsidiarity, 6 PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM, 57, 67 (2014).  
134 See Moens & Trone, supra note 131, at 77. 
135 TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 183-188 (2nd ed. 2006); see also Moens & Trone, supra note 131, 
at 77-78. Werner Vandenbruwaene disagrees with this view and argues that subsidiarity is a legal principle. On the 
basis of comparative studies, he proposes alternative strategies for the enforcement of subsidiarity in the EU, see 
Vandenbruwaene, supra note 133. 
136 See Davies, supra note 131, at 67-68. If only for this reason, I disagree with Ester Herlin-Karnell where she states 
in Subsidiarity in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs Law – A Lost Cause?, EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 351-361 (2009) 
that in the context of EU criminal law the principle of subsidiarity is the EU equivalent of the last resort principle. 
Under the last resort principle, the first question that needs to be answered in the affirmative is whether the type 
of conduct under consideration requires a criminal law approach as such, irrespective of whether criminal law 
measures should be taken nationally or at the EU-level. This first question is, however, ignored where the necessity 
condition under the subsidiarity test boils down to the question of whether the protection of EU objectives requires 
EU-level harmonisation. 
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national interests nor other public interests that could militate against EU action are seriously 
assessed by the Court of Justice. Moreover, defined in terms of EU objectives, such objectives 
(e.g. the achievement of free movement) can automatically be better achieved by the EU, simply 
because it has the power to adopt uniform legislation. The situation becomes almost funny in 
those cases where the very aim of the proposed measure is harmonisation as such; 
harmonisation can for instance be considered necessary in order to prevent or end differences 
in national legislation causing trade barriers or obstacles to free movement. It goes without 
saying that the objective of harmonisation cannot be achieved by the Member States acting 
alone, and can in any case be better achieved by the EU.137 To reason that in such cases the 
subsidiarity principle has been fulfilled basically amounts to circular reasoning. That the Court 
nevertheless rejects corresponding criticism in such cases138 cannot but lead to the conclusion 
that subsidiarity challenges will automatically fail. In other words, there is not much to expect 
from the principle of subsidiarity anyhow where it comes to controlling the exercise of powers. 
In view of that, it will not come as a surprise that an EU measure has never been annulled on the 
basis of subsidiarity.  
Considering the aforementioned weak judicial review of subsidiarity before the Court in 
connection with the absence of clear substantive guidelines for testing subsidiarity, it must be 
concluded that subsidiarity is currently incapable of overruling the divergences in substantive 
legal requirements for criminalisation.  
 
The role of proportionality in restraining the exercise of EU powers 
The principle of proportionally essentially requires that EU action does not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve its goals. Thus, the proportionality principle determines how the EU should 
act. This how-question may either relate to the substance of a chosen measure (e.g. whether the 
scope of a criminal prohibition is proportional), or to its procedural aspects (e.g. whether the 
chosen measure – for instance a regulation instead of a directive – is proportional). It therefore 
                                                          
137 See also Davies, supra note 131. 
138 See United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-84/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:431, ¶ 47; The Queen v. Secretary of State for 
Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., et al, Case C-491/01, ECLI:EU:C2002:741 ¶¶ 181-183; 
Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523; Alliance for Natural Health 
and others, Joined Cases C-154/04 and 155/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:449, ¶¶ 105-107. 
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must first be examined whether the proportionality principle, as applied in EU law, covers the 
most stringent substantive legal requirements for criminalisation, and second whether it urges 
or requires recourse to the most stringent procedural requirements (or from a Member States’ 
perspective: the least intrusive measures).  
 
To be able to answer these questions, it is necessary to have a closer look at the content of 
proportionality in the EU context. What proportionality actually means or should mean in the 
practice of law-making can be derived from the European Court of Justice’s case-law which – in 
contrast to case-law on the subsidiarity principle – has formulated criteria in order to check 
fulfillment of the proportionality principle. The Court conventionally applies a triple test. It first 
tests if the proposed measure is appropriate or suitable to achieve the pursued aim 
(appropriateness test, or suitability test); if so, whether the chosen measure is necessary to 
achieve that aim (necessity test, or “least restrictive measure” test), and, thirdly, whether the 
proposed measures is proportional to the stated goal (stricto sensu test).139  
If these elements of proportionality are compared to the most stringent substantive 
requirements for criminalisation (as aforementioned)140, it is clear from the outset that neither 
the cross-border dimension of Article 83(1) TFEU nor the harmonisation requirement of Article 
83(2) TFEU fall under the scope of the proportionality requirement. Upon closer consideration, 
the same conclusion must be drawn with regard to the requirement of necessity as it has been 
included in Articles 83(2) and 325(4) TFEU. Whereas under these provisions necessity must 
respectively relate to the effective implementation of previous harmonisation measures in EU 
policy areas, or to the effective and equivalent protection against EU-fraud, necessity under the 
proportionality principle rather relates to the pursued aim of the proposed measure itself. It 
needs no explanation that this latter necessity requirement is broader in scope than the more 
specific necessity conditions included in Articles 83(2) and 325(4) TFEU; the only fact that the 
                                                          
139 See, e.g., Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case C-44/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290, ¶ 23; Commission v. 
Germany, Case C-116/82, ECLI:EU:C:1986:322, ¶ 21. See also Tridimas, supra note 135, at 139-140; Grainne De Búrca, 
The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, 13 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW, 105 (1993).  
140 See supra Section II.B.  
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pursued objective has not been predetermined makes it much easier to fulfill the necessity 
requirement under the proportionality principle.  
Illustrative in this regard is the Court’s judgment in the Swedish Match case: in this case, it was 
claimed that to prohibit the marketing of tobacco products for oral use, as included in Directive 
2001/37/EC, breached the proportionality principle. But given the Directive’s aim – which is to 
establish a high level of protection of human health – it cannot surprise that the prohibition was 
considered proportionate; complete prohibition obviously contributes to a higher level of health 
protection than less preventive measures.141 The critical comments that were made above in the 
context of subsidiarity equally apply to the necessity part of the proportionality test. The fact that 
justification of EU action is defined in terms of goals to be achieved makes it rather easy to fulfill 
the condition of necessity by simply formulating an objective (e.g. harmonisation) which cannot 
be achieved by less restrictive measures. This applies all the more since it is on those who claim 
a breach of proportionality to show the existence of less restrictive measures.142  
 
To follow up on this issue of less restrictive measures, the aforementioned interpretation of the 
necessity aspect of proportionality (including the fact that the existence of such measures must 
be demonstrated by the applicant) does not sound very promising for the procedural side of the 
coin. As appears, the various legal bases for criminalisation diverge significantly.143 The most 
stringent procedural requirements are to be found in Article 83 TFEU. It concerns: minimum rules 
through directives, the availability of the emergency brake procedure, and a threshold of 25 
percent for subsidiarity controls by national parliaments. In view of the necessity test (also called 
the “least restrictive measure” test), the question arises if under this test it is required to use the 
least intrusive measures, both from the perspective of Member States and from the perspective 
of the individual; that way, proportionality could contribute to safeguarding the application of 
stricter procedural conditions for criminalisation. The question must, however, be answered in 
the negative. The fact remains that justified EU action is defined in the terms of the stated 
                                                          
141 Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v. Secretary of State for Health, Case C-210/03, ECLI:EU:C:2004:802, 
¶¶ 46-58.  
142 Luxembourgh v. Parliament and Council, Case C-176/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:290, ¶ 67. 
143 See supra Section II.A. 
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objectives of such action, and that the weight of demonstrating the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives has been placed on the applicant’s shoulders.  
 
The foregoing suggests that the Court’s review of the necessity aspect of proportionality has not 
been very meaningful so far. This conclusion has been supported by several commentators with 
regard to the judicial enforcement of the proportionality principle in general. Analyses144 have 
shown that when assessing EU legislation the Court allows the legislature a broad discretion, at 
least in areas “which involve political, economic and social choices on its part”145, such as public 
health policy,146 transport policy147, environmental policy148, agricultural policy149, social 
policy150, and in the area of combating EU-fraud.151 In such areas, EU legislation will only be 
quashed for violating proportionality if it is “manifestly inappropriate” to achieve the objectives 
pursued.152 This “manifestly inappropriate”-test applies to both the suitability aspect and the 
necessity aspect of proportionality.153 It plainly leaves ample discretion to the EU legislature.  
 
Moreover, the application of the stricto sensu test has sharply been criticized. While it is clear 
that proportionality stricto sensu stipulates that the proposed measure does not involve 
excessive effects on the applicant’s interests, its exact content remains rather abstract. The 
application by the Court of Justice of the third test can therefore work out either way, and as 
such also fails to provide objective guidelines for the EU legislature.154 
                                                          
144 Öberg, supra note 42, at 27-32; Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 
European Law Journal, 171 et seq. (2010); Tridimas, supra note 135, at 136-174.  
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The foregoing must lead to the conclusion that proportionality cannot counter the divergences 
in requirements for EU-level criminalisation.  
 
2. Hierarchy of Legal Bases: A Largely Unsolved Matter 
 
This Section deals with the question of how the right legal basis for criminalisation must be 
determined in situations where several alternative competences could be invoked. As things are, 
this is a most relevant question; without any indication of which provision takes priority over 
others, the EU legislature would be able to choose the most favorable provision in terms of 
procedural and/or substantive requirements for criminalisation. It is needless to say that such a 
method of decision-making would encourage a somewhat calculating approach towards 
decision-making in a context that rather calls for a principled approach, both with a view to 
individuals’ rights and freedoms and to ensure respect for national criminal justice systems and 
traditions. In spite of this, however, the most relevant question of how the right legal basis must 
be determined in concrete cases of proposed legislation cannot be answered unequivocally. The 
following describes that amongst legal scholars as well as within the EU legislature opinions differ 
on the exact relationship between overlapping criminalisation powers; and that the European 
Court of Justice’s marginal review in choice of legal basis disputes has thrown some, but not much 
light on the matter.  
 
Amongst legal scholars, the relationship between criminalisation competences has especially 
been viewed from the perspective of the express criminalisation competences provided for in 
Article 83 TFEU. From that perspective, several commentators have expressed their views on 
whether Article 83 TFEU has to be interpreted as a lex specialis to the implied criminalisation 
competences envisaged in other Treaty provisions.  
Asp takes the most perspicuous viewpoint on the matter. His opinion that Article 83 TFEU is a lex 
specialis in relation to other potential legal bases for EU-level criminalisation logically follows 
from that he firmly rejects the existence of a general criminalisation competence outside Article 
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83 TFEU.155 The only alternative legal basis for criminalisation that he would be ready to accept 
is Article 325(4) TFEU (relating to EU-fraud), although, according to Asp, this ancillary competence 
only exists in combination with Article 83(2) TFEU: “Article 325 TFEU does not […] provide the EU 
with Article 83(2)-independent criminal law competence”.156 Asp does not elaborate on what the 
practical consequence of his view would be, for instance whether criminal prohibitions in the 
field of EU-fraud can only be adopted under the joint heading of both articles. His opinion is clear 
enough anyhow: Neither Article 325(4) TFEU nor any other Treaty provision can take priority over 
Article 83(2) TFEU.  
As to criminalisation competences in the field of EU-fraud, Mitsilegas takes an opposite stand; he 
states that Article 325(4) TFEU constitutes a lex specialis to Article 83(2) TFEU.157 But with regard 
to criminalisation competences in the field of human trafficking, the view of Asp seems to be 
shared by Satzger who believes Article 83(1) TFEU is a lex specialis to Article 79(2) TFEU. Quite 
ambiguously, however, Satzger states that Article 83(1) TFEU only takes precedence over Article 
27(2) TFEU insofar the EU legislature wishes to adopt minimum rules through directives158, 
thereby suggesting that if the EU legislature has decided in advance to opt for supranational 
criminal law provisions the relationship between Articles 83(1) and 79(2) TFEU has no relevance, 
simply because Article 83(1) TFEU does not allow for the adoption of supranational criminal law.  
Asp’s view that no Treaty provision can take priority over Article 83 TFEU has also been contested 
in the context of Article 114 TFEU. This latter provision has been interpreted as providing a legal 
basis for regulatory criminalisation, namely with a view to internal market approximation. When 
examining the precise relationship between Article 114 TFEU and Article 83(2) TFEU, attention 
could be drawn to the first sentence of Article 114(1) TFEU: “Save where otherwise provided in 
the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in 
Article 26” (i.e. the internal market objective). This expression suggests that Article 114 TFEU is 
subsidiary to other more specific legal bases for establishing and ensuring the internal market. 
According to Herlin-Karnell this is indeed the case. But according to her, Article 83(2) TFEU cannot 
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be considered a “more specific legal basis”, particularly because unlike Article 114 TFEU, Article 
83(2) TFEU does not envisage any threshold in terms of market creation. Herlin-Karnell therefore 
concludes that Article 114 TFEU should take precedence over Article 83(2) TFEU.159  
 
Amongst the EU institutions, differences of opinion have been pronounced in the area of EU-
fraud. While EU-level criminal prohibitions in this field can also be adopted under the heading of 
Article 83(2) TFEU – after all, fraud against the EU’s financial interests concerns an area in which 
harmonisation has taken place – the Commission’s remark on Article 325(4) TFEU in its 2011 
Communication on EU Criminal Policy suggests that it sees Article 325(4) TFEU as a lex specialis 
to Article 83(2) TFEU: “[…] Article 325 (4) of the Treaty provides for the specific possibility to take 
measures in the field of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests 
of the Union, a field where some pre-Lisbon legislation already exists” (italics added).160 The 
Commission’s proposal for a Directive on the fight against EU-fraud confirms this interpretation: 
the proposal, which requires Member States to criminalise EU-fraud and related activities, is 
based on Article 325(4) TFEU.161  
But the appropriateness of this legal basis has been called into question by the Council Legal 
Service and the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs. Both have argued that Article 
83(2) TFEU must be regarded as a lex specialis to Article 325(4) TFEU, and that therefore Article 
83(2) TFEU constitutes the proper legal basis for the proposed EU-level criminalisation of EU-
fraud.162 What their arguments boil down to is that the opposite view would make it too easy to 
circumvent the specific and strong requirements of Article 83(2) TFEU and deprive this provision 
of its “practical applicability”.163 
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Over the past decades legal basis disputes have arisen frequently, predominantly in matters 
outside the criminal law sphere. Quite a number of disputes have been brought before the 
European Court of Justice which has resulted in the development of the so-called “choice of legal 
basis” doctrine. According to this doctrine, EU institutions are not free to choose the legal basis 
they prefer for whatever reason; instead, the choice of legal basis must be based on “objective 
factors which are amenable to judicial review”. Factors of particular importance are the aim and 
content of the proposed measure.164 Furthermore, it has been ruled that the most specific legal 
basis takes priority over alternative powers.165 If a measure appears to pursue two aims, or if its 
content comprises two components, the Court applies the so-called “centre of gravity” test: if 
one of the aims or components can be qualified as dominant over the other, the measure must 
rest on a single legal basis, i.e. the legal basis required by the dominant aim or component.166  
For several reasons, commentators have criticized this aspect of the “choice of legal basis” 
doctrine. Firstly, it has convincingly been argued that the “centre of gravity” test actually enables 
the legislature to choose the preferred legal basis, simply by drafting the proposed measure in 
such a way that the objectives of this legal basis are especially emphasized.167 As Miettinen has 
aptly put it, “the appropriate choice is in practice determined by the text of the instrument”.168  
A second point of critique comes from Miettinen himself and relates to how the incompatibility 
of two legal bases seems to influence the “centre of gravity” approach.169 It is settled case-law 
that a measure cannot rest on joint legal bases if the corresponding legislative procedures differ 
                                                          
164 See, e.g.,  Commission v. Council, Case C-300/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:244 (Titanium dioxide case), ¶ 10; Commission 
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significantly.170  In the framework of this paper, this issue is of particular relevance since Article 
83 TFEU is very likely to be seen as incompatible with most alternative legal bases for EU-level 
criminalisation; the Court’s case-law suggests that the procedure envisaged in Article 83 TFEU 
cannot be reconciled with the procedures envisaged in most other provisions.171 In view of this, 
it is worrying to observe that criminal law components of proposed legislation easily seem to be 
qualified as ancillary, rather as predominant, especially in cases where the proposed measure 
links to another EU policy, such as transport policy.172 To base such legislation on a single legal 
basis outside the AFSJ suggests that the requirements of Article 83 TFEU can easily be 
circumvented in measures that are linked to a substantive EU policy.173 
 
All in all, the various (potential) legal bases for EU-level criminalisation lack a clear order or 
precedence. The Court’s review in choice of legal basis disputes is only marginal and reliance on 
the important safeguards of Article 83 TFEU is not actively protected or encouraged. That way 
the Lisbon Treaty leaves ample opportunity to circumvent legal requirements that in a specific 
case are considered less convenient.  
 
3. THE CASE FOR A SINGLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRIMINALISATION AT THE EU LEVEL 
 
It follows from what precedes that the existence of parallel legal bases for EU-level 
criminalisation currently enables the EU legislature to opt for the provision that in a specific 
situation is considered most convenient. This would not automatically have to result in picking 
the more lenient requirements, but it cannot be excluded that less stringent requirements are 
regarded as more convenient by law-making practitioners. This amounts to a risk of cherry-
picking between legal bases for the adoption of EU-wide criminal prohibitions. The core 
                                                          
170 Parliament v. Council, Case C-155/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:605, ¶ 37; Parliament v. Council, Case C-130/10, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:472 , ¶ 49. 
171 Commission v. Council, Case C-370/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:590, ¶ 48. See also Samuli Miettinen, Implied ancillary 
criminal law competence after Lisbon, 3 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 207 (2013).  
172 To underpin this, Miettinen analyzed three relevant judgments (i.e. Commission v. Parliament, Case C-43/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:298; Commission v. Council, Case C-137/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:675; and Parliament v. Council, Case C-
658/11, ECLI:EU:C;2014:2025), see Miettinen, supra note 168, at 228-241.  
173 Miettinen, supra note 172, at 241.  
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argument of this paper is that differences in requirements for EU-level criminalisation cannot be 
accepted, let alone that in an individual case the EU legislature can choose the most convenient 
requirements. Rather, the EU needs a single legal framework for the adoption of criminal 
prohibitions. The following provides the two correlating reasons that give rise to this statement. 
 
The first aspect that needs to be pointed out here is the long-standing, widely supported view 
amongst criminal law experts that the criminalisation of conduct requires a careful approach, 
because of the very consequences of criminalisation on citizens’ life.174 The effects of 
criminalisation go beyond the mere prohibition of a specific kind of behaviour. Among other 
things the entry into force of a criminal prohibition creates a variety of state powers to be 
enforced against those who (allegedly) do not comply with the criminal law; Simester & Von 
Hirsch characterize the criminal law as “a coercive system, directed at controlling the behaviour 
of citizens”.175 Law enforcement actions against citizens who (allegedly) broke the criminal law 
may cause serious infringements on their rights and privacy with the deprivation of liberty as the 
most drastic tool of law enforcement. Moreover, the moral voice of the criminal law is likely to 
generate a social stigma on those who have been suspected or convicted for the commitment of 
a crime. If only because of these potentially interfering and stigmatising consequences of 
illegalizing conduct the decision to invoke the criminal law requires explicit and thorough 
justifications, irrespective of whether such a decision is taken at the national level or at the EU 
level.176  
                                                          
174 This view has traditionally been widely acknowledged, see, amongst others, L.H.C. HULSMAN, HANDHAVING VAN RECHT 
(1965) (only available in Dutch, on the intersection of administrative law, civil law and criminal law and arguing that 
the criminal law should only be called for as a last resort); THEO A. DE ROOS, STRAFBAARSTELLING VAN ECONOMISCHE DELICTEN 
(1987) (only available in Dutch, presenting a model for criminalisation of economic crimes which is based on the 
premise that the criminal law should only be used when other mechanisms fail), Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law 
as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 207-235 (2004); LINDSAY FARMER, R.A. DUFF, S.E. MARSHALL, MASSIMO 
RENZO & VICTOR TRADOS, THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2010); A.P. SIMESTER & ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, HARMS 
AND WRONGS. ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALISATION 19-32 in particular (2012).  
175 See Simester & Von Hirsch, supra note 174, at 19.  
176 A careful approach towards criminalisation at the EU level has widely been acknowledged as well, see for instance: 
Petter Asp et al, A Manifesto on European Criminal Policy (European Criminal Policy Initiative), 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 
INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 707-716 (2009); Ester Herlin-Karnell, What Principles Drive (or Should Drive) 
European Criminal Law?, 11 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 1115-1124 (2010); Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi, The Importance of Core 
Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of 
Law, 1 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 7-34 (2011); Petter Asp, The Importance of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
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This has also been recognised explicitly in EU policy documents, such as the European 
Commission’s 2011 Communication on EU criminal policy and the European Parliament’s 
Resolution on EU criminal law.177 Moreover, the need for a careful approach towards calling on 
the criminal law follows from the EU’s adherence to the spirit of liberal democracy, as has been 
expressed in Article 2 TEU.178 As a community based on the rule of law, respect for human dignity 
and human rights, freedom, democracy and equality,179 the EU recognizes the sensitive nature 
of criminal law in general, simply because criminal law measures are potentially at odds with 
these values. It would therefore befit the EU legislature to exercise its criminalisation powers 
with restraint. Now, one could hold different views on which criteria would justify the adoption 
of criminal prohibitions in a certain area of crime; but it goes without saying that the agreed 
criteria for criminalisation would go completely out of power if they apply off and on.  
 
This brings us to the second issue, i.e. coherence which is much needed in the context of EU 
criminal law. The possibility of cherry-picking between legal bases for criminalisation threatens 
the consistent exercise of criminalisation powers which, in turn, hinders the development of a 
coherent EU criminal policy. The need for coherence in the area of criminal law has broadly been 
recognised. The European Commission stated in its 2011 Communication on EU criminal policy 
that “it is particularly important to ensure that EU legislation on criminal law, in order to have a 
real added value, is consistent and coherent”.180 And in its 2012 Resolution on EU criminal law, 
the European Parliament even observed “the need for increased coherence” because criminal 
                                                          
Coherence in the Development of EU Criminal Law,  1 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 44-55 (2011); Jannemieke 
Ouwerkerk, Criminalisation as a last resort: a national principle under the pressure of Europeanisation?, 4 NEW 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW, 228-241 (2012).  
177 European Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of 
EU policies through criminal law, COM(2011) 573 final, at 6; European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on an 
EU approach to criminal law, P7_TA(2012)0208, under I (on the principles that should govern criminal law decision-
making, on the importance of evidence-based legislation in this regard, and on the need for a coherent approach 
towards criminal policy amongst the EU institutions). 
178 Tridimas, supra note 135, at 15.  
179 See Treaty on European Union, art. 6, Dec. 26 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1; Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, art. 20, Dec. 26 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 12 
2007, 2007 O.J. 2007 (C 303) 1 (all expressing the European Union’s constitutional commitment to the rule of law).  
180 European Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of 
EU policies through criminal law, COM(2011) 573 final, at 3.  
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law provisions have so far been adopted on an “ad hoc basis”.181 For the aim of creating more 
coherence in the area of criminal law, both the Commission and the Parliament have pointed out 
which principles and norms should be taken into account when legislating on matters of 
substantive criminal law. And academics too have formulated sets of principles and norms that 
should govern the exercise of EU criminalisation competences.182  
However, none of these initiatives is capable of solving the cherry picking issues as described 
above. Both the Commission’s Communication and the Parliament’s Resolution fail because of 
their limited scope; the Commission has only referred to Articles 83 and 325(4) TFEU183, whereas 
the Parliament has simply and solely referred to Article 83 TFEU.184 No other legal bases for 
criminalisation have been mentioned. Given that the Treaty contains several other (potential) 
legal bases for criminalisation, an indeed coherent application of criminalisation competences 
under Articles 83 and 325(4) TFEU will still not suffice to establish a coherent EU criminalisation 
policy.  
Neither adequate are the academic appeals for coherence by formulating which principles must 
be taken into consideration when exercising criminalisation powers. It is true that Asp’s “meta-
norms” are considered to apply to any exercise of EU criminalisation powers, but it has been 
shown that Asp only acknowledges criminalisation powers under Articles 83 and 325 TFEU.185 
And while the 2009 Manifesto on European Criminal Policy does seem to refer to criminalisation 
under whatever Treaty provision – when it states that the listed principles “should be recognised 
as a basis for every single legal instrument which deals with or which could influence criminal 
law” – the existence of legal bases outside Articles 83 and 325 TFEU have not explicitly been 
mentioned. Moreover, even if the Manifesto must be interpreted as applying to the exercise of 
criminalisation competences under whichever legal basis, the fact remains that the listed 
                                                          
181 European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law, P7_TA(2012)0208, under N, 
and also under H and O.  
182 See Asp et al, supra note 176; See also Asp’s publication in which he formulates so-called “meta-norms”, supra 
note 6, at 164-212.  
183 European Commission Communication, supra note 180, at 5-6.  
184 European Parliament Resolution, supra note 181, under B.  
185 As stated in his chapter on “meta-norms”: “This chapter gives an account of the most important meta-norms that 
must be taken into consideration by the EU when exercising the competences it has according to the description and 
analysis above in chapters 4 and 5” (italics added), see Asp, supra note 6, at 164.  
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“fundamental principles of criminal policy” are not suitable to do away with all differences in 
requirements for EU-level criminal prohibitions, if only because the principles that have been 
agreed upon by the signing academics maintain the divergences in procedural requirements 
across the Treaty.  
So, while initiatives so far will not suffice to develop a coherent policy with regard to EU-level 
criminalisation, the importance of coherence has been broadly recognised for obvious reasons. 
Firstly, the incoherent use of criminalisation powers creates insecurity amongst citizens and 
Member States as to the potential influence of EU law on national criminal law which is highly 
undesirable given its interfering nature. Secondly, if criminalisation competences are exercised 
incoherently, the adopted criminal prohibitions in their entirety are very likely to fall short of 
reflecting the agreed values of justice and blameworthiness; this threatens the legitimacy of 
harmonisation measures in the area of substantive criminal law.  
It needs to be underlined that in order to be able to reflect collectively agreed values, the pursuit 
of coherence in the context of EU-level criminalisation should go beyond the level of EU law; it 
necessarily includes national criminal law. After all, EU-wide criminal prohibitions apply within 
the national legal orders of the respective Member States. It is not impossible that a specific 
definition of an offence conflicts with a fundamental value of a certain national criminal justice 
system (one could think of the doctrinal cornerstone that preparatory acts should not be 
criminalised). That way EU criminal law could disturb the inner coherence of national criminal 
law which for the above stated reasons cannot be justified.  
 
The European Union needs a single legal framework for criminalisation so that equal 
requirements must be fulfilled each time the EU legislature wishes to walk the path of 
criminalisation. With a single legal framework, the EU would be better equipped to give voice to 
the specific nature of criminal law as well as to establish a coherent criminal policy. Moreover, if 
the EU legislature would no longer be able to juggle with legal bases for criminalisation it is very 
likely that such would raise awareness on the importance of careful and coherent law-making in 
the field of criminal law. Under the current situation this awareness may well exist amongst those 
attached to the justice departments of EU law-making, but for those based in the market and 
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trade departments the probable lack of knowledge and awareness on the needs of criminal 
justice should not be underestimated. A single legal framework for EU-level criminalisation could 
turn the tide, also because it would urge the need for inter-institutional and inter-departmental 
consultation and knowledge exchange.  
 
Now there are several ways to realise such a single legal framework. A first option would be to 
create a new legal basis which would apply exclusively. This single source of competence should 
codify the procedural and substantive requirements that have been agreed upon in the course 
of in-depth discussions on the limits of EU-level criminalisation of conduct. Secondly, rather than 
creating a brand new legal provision, the exclusive legal basis could be chosen from the various 
legal bases that are currently existing under the Lisbon Treaty; given that Article 83 TFEU provides 
the most stringent criminalisation requirements one could imagine that this provision would 
widely be considered the most obvious choice. The third option is only slightly different from the 
previous one; instead of choosing one legal basis and doing away with the others, it would be 
possible to designate one of the existing legal bases as a lex specialis to all other potential 
criminalisation competences; again, the choice for Article 83 TFEU would be most likely.  
Which of these options is preferred? The answer to this question obviously depends on the 
extent to which each of these options is capable to counter the unacceptable effects of divergent 
criminalisation requirements. It is true that the three options as presented above only modestly 
differ from each other, but in view of the need to establish a single legal framework an exclusively 
applicable legal basis (first and second option) is preferable to designating one provision as a lex 
specialis (third option). After all, the lex specialis concept would be too weak a tool to discourage 
or preclude the use of an alternative legal basis if considered more convenient, e.g. because of 
less severe criminalisation requirements. It has been shown that the Court of Justice’s “choice of 
legal basis-doctrine” and its marginal review in that regard leaves ample opportunity to 
circumvent the legal requirements of a more specific legal basis, especially if the proposed 
measure links to a substantive EU policy.186 It is therefore more appropriate to develop a sole 
legal basis for EU-level criminalisation. Whether this sole legal basis should either be engrafted 
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onto the express criminalisation competence of Article 83 TFEU, or freshly developed relates to 
the question of which procedural and substantive requirements should be included in such a sole 
legal basis; this question will be dealt with in the next Part.  
 
Obviously, the most drastic way to establish a single legal framework for criminalisation of 
conduct at the EU level, in either of the aforementioned forms, would be through treaty 
amendment. Though time-consuming and politically complex, the very idea may not be ignored; 
as explained above, there are fundamental values at issue in the field of EU criminal law. In the 
shorter term, however, there might be another road to follow in a forward direction, i.e. the 
inter-institutional adoption of binding guidelines for criminalisation. Inter-institutional 
agreements are nothing new. Under the Lisbon Treaty, Article 295 TFEU provides the legal basis. 
It envisages the conclusion of inter-institutional agreements which may be binding for the 
contracting institutions. Yet recently the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission 
have signed an inter-institutional agreement on better law-making187, a topic as to which an 
agreement has already been concluded in the past.188 Provided that it would lay down binding 
guidelines on EU-level criminalisation, the possibility of concluding such an agreement is in my 
view worth considering – if only as a first step towards establishing a more coherent legal 
framework on the matter.  
 
4. TOWARDS A SINGLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EU-LEVEL CRIMINALISATION:  
INITIAL THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DEBATE 
 
As argued above, the risk of cherry-picking between legal requirements for criminalisation cannot 
be accepted in the EU legal order. For that reason, it has been advocated to develop a single legal 
framework for EU-level criminalisation. But how should this look like?  
                                                          
187 European Parliament, Council, and Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, 2016 O.J. (L 
123). 
188 European Parliament, Council, and Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, 2003 O.J. (C 
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This Part concerns the possible design of a single legal framework for criminalisation of conduct 
at the EU level. The aim is not to present a comprehensive set of single requirements, rather to 
share initial thoughts on the procedural and substantive requirements that EU-level 
criminalisation should stipulate. This rough outline will certainly leave open a number of 
questions which require further examination. Whereas I am looking forward to proceed to 
examine these questions, I also hope that this paper encourages other scholars to undertake 
research on the matter. The following could serve to kick-off this future research efforts.  
 
A. Towards Single Procedural Requirements for EU-Level Criminalisation 
 
A single legal framework for EU-level criminalisation implicates inter alia a single set of 
procedural requirements that are applicable each time the EU legislature wishes to adopt 
criminal prohibitions. Such a single set of procedural requirements does not apply yet. It has been 
shown that the existence of concurrent criminalisation competences enables the EU legislature 
to circumvent significant procedural requirements, such as the confinement of Article 83 TFEU 
to: minimum harmonisation by means of directives requiring implementation into national law; 
the possibility that Member States invoke the emergency brake procedure; and the lower 
threshold for subsidiarity controls by national parliaments.189  
Because an overall comparison between (potential) legal bases for criminalisation learns that 
Article 83 TFEU contains the most stringent procedural requirements, one could easily be inclined 
to advocate articulating this very provision as the single source of competence for EU criminal 
prohibitions. But are the procedural requirements laid down in Article 83 most appropriate to 
safeguard both a careful exercise of EU criminalisation powers and coherent law-making?  
 
Viewed from the perspectives of careful and coherent law-making – which have been qualified 
as fundamental aspects of each criminalisation policy190 – not all of the procedural requirements 
laid down in Article 83 TFEU can unambiguously be supported.  
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The aspect of careful law-making is definitely served by the restriction to minimum norms in 
directives. Both requirements convey a degree of restraint with regard to adopting EU-level 
prohibitions on the basis of Article 83 TFEU. And from the perspective of coherence, the choice 
for the instrument of the directive can be supported as it expresses a choice for coherent law-
making in the field of substantive criminal law. The required process of adopting implementation 
legislation leaves some room for Member States to preserve the systematics of national criminal 
law, of course insofar the directive’s result will be achieved. Besides, the same goes for the 
existence of the emergency brake procedure, a tool that certainly has the potential to protect the 
inner coherence of national criminal law.  
However, it is the restriction of Article 83 TFEU to minimum rules where – viewed from the 
perspective of coherence – the trouble might come in, for it is the very idea of minimum rules to 
enable individual Member States to adopt in their national legislation a broader scope of criminal 
prohibitions.191 This way, the adoption of minimum rules could threaten the coherence of the 
EU’s criminalisation policy. This could be considered problematic, even though minimum 
standards have the advantage to better serve the inner coherence of a national criminalisation 
policy. Precisely here the tension between national coherence and EU-wide coherence comes to 
the surface. If it is true that minimum rules are likely to have a negative effect on the 
development of a coherent EU criminal policy, it should be open for discussion whether either 
minimum harmonisation or another level of harmonisation (e.g. maximum harmonisation192) 
would be appropriate for EU-level criminalisation. 
 
Because of what precedes it would be a foregone conclusion to state that Article 83 TFEU 
provides an adequate body of procedural requirements which could in full be incorporated in a 
                                                          
191 This dominant interpretation of “minimum rules” has recently been defended by Petter Asp, see supra note 6, at 
111-127. It has, however, been contested by Hans Nilsson who argues that such an interpretation would be contrary 
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criminal prohibitions. According to Nilsson, minimum rules regarding the description of prohibited conduct that are 
adopted under the Lisbon Treaty are “maximum rules” already, see supra note 191.  
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single legal framework for EU-level criminalisation. To be able to identify the degree of 
harmonisation that is needed to best ensure the coherence of the EU’s criminal policy, requires 
further study on the relationship between minimum harmonisation and a coherent 
criminalisation policy within the EU and its Member States.  
 
B. Towards Single Substantive Requirements for EU-Level Criminalisation 
 
A single set of substantive requirements for criminalisation of conduct at the EU level is needed 
to end the current situation in which substantive conditions for the adoption of EU-level criminal 
prohibitions diverge throughout the various sources of competence. As things are, the EU 
legislature has in several areas of crime the ability to circumvent the most stringent substantive 
requirements by applying a concurrent legal basis. It has been demonstrated that in the area of 
human trafficking the existence of parallel legal bases offers the opportunity to by-pass the cross-
border requirement of Article 83(1) TFEU. And with regard to criminalisation for the aim of 
achieving a Union policy, picking on an alternative legal basis would mean a circumvention of the 
harmonisation requirement and in some cases also the essentiality/necessity condition of Article 
83(2) TFEU. That way, criminal prohibitions would in most cases also have a wider geographical 
scope because outside Title V TFEU the UK, Ireland and Denmark cannot invoke their opt-outs 
arrangements. It has been concluded that under those circumstances there is a real risk of cherry-
picking between legal bases.  
 
Although the foregoing might seem to suggest that Article 83 TFEU stipulates the most stringent 
substantive requirements for EU-level criminalisation, such a statement is not supported by the 
outcomes of the comparison carried out in this paper.193 As a matter of fact, it is impossible to 
give an unambiguous answer to the question of which (potential) legal basis provides the most 
stringent substantive requirements.  
This can best be demonstrated by means of Article 83 TFEU, for this provision in itself fails to 
comprehend a single set of substantive requirements for EU-level criminalisation. Under the first 
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paragraph which envisages criminalisation in specified areas of crime, other substantive 
requirements apply than under the second paragraph which allows for regulatory criminalisation 
in previously harmonised EU policy areas. Consequently, even if Article 83 TFEU would apply 
exclusively, different substantive requirements will apply anyway, depending on whether 
proposed criminal prohibitions are based under the first or the second paragraph.194 It has been 
mentioned before that according to Mitsilegas the two paragraphs of Article 83 TFEU reflect 
different views on criminalisation. Whereas Article 83(1) TFEU provides a competence for 
“securitised criminalisation” – i.e. responding to global security threats – Article 83(2) TFEU 
envisages “functional criminalisation” – i.e. criminalisation for policy implementation.195 This 
could explain why both paragraphs differ as to the substantive requirements they stipulate.  
However, the distinction between securitised criminalisation and functional criminalisation does 
not help to explain the mutual divergences in substantive requirements under the other 
(potential) legal bases for criminalisation.196 For example, Article 79 TFEU can be characterized 
as providing an alternative legal basis for securitised criminalisation, namely in the specific area 
of human trafficking – an area that has also been mentioned under Article 83(1) TFEU. But unlike 
Article 83(1) TFEU, Article 79 TFEU does not demand fulfillment of the cross-border requirement.  
  
In this patchwork of substantive requirements none of the Treaty provisions holds an obvious 
example for developing a single set of requirements for EU-level criminalisation. Even the most 
comprehensive source of competence, Article 83 TFEU, cannot automatically be considered 
suitable for this purpose. True as it may be that the divergences in requirements under the first 
and second paragraph of this provision could be explained with reference to the different views 
on criminalisation they wish to express, it could be argued that accepting these divergences 
would as such be at odds with the ambition to establish a coherent criminalisation policy in the 
EU.  
Therefore, in the absence of an obvious model provision, the identification of single substantive 
requirements for EU-level criminalisation requires a fresh determination of which specific 
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substantive requirements are needed to safeguard a careful exercise of EU criminalisation 
powers as well as coherent law-making (previously, both parameters have been qualified as 
fundamental to any criminalisation policy).197 For instance, in concrete terms: Should EU-level 
criminal prohibitions always require a cross-border element of the conduct they aim to prohibit? 
And if it is agreed that EU-level criminal prohibitions can only be adopted if necessary, what 
exactly should be the object(s) of necessity? Must criminalisation be necessary for the 
effectiveness of a Union policy, or for the effectiveness of judicial cooperation between Member 
States, or both?  
 
In order to be able to establish a single set of substantive requirements for EU-level 
criminalisation, it is one step to conclude that such an exercise requires a fresh determination of 
which requirements are needed. It is another step to decide how such requirements are to be 
determined. The following argues that it is first necessary to agree on the objectives that EU 
criminalisation may legitimately pursue as these would contribute to the articulation of the 
substantive requirements that EU-level criminalisation calls for.  
 
1. The Identification of Legitimate Objectives of EU-Level Criminalisation 
 
In order to be able to establish a single legal framework for criminalisation, it needs to be clarified 
which values the European Union wishes to express in the whole of criminal prohibitions adopted 
within its legal order. This leitmotiv question could be answered at various levels, for instance at 
the level of principles that should govern the exercise of criminalisation powers by the state or 
by the transnational legislature. In that regard, several scholars have been referring to commonly 
accepted principles of last resort, legality, guilt, subsidiarity and proportionality.198 As already 
mentioned, those principles have also been referred to by EU institutions in their policy 
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Policy’, submitted by a number of academics in Asp et al, supra note 176. 
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documents on the exercise of powers in the field of substantive criminal law.199 Being commonly 
accepted principles, they apply in the national criminal justice systems of the EU Member States 
and their mentioning in the context of EU criminalisation is therefore not very surprising.  
Yet for the purpose of formulating single substantive requirements the articulation of these 
principles has very limited added value. This particularly applies to the references to subsidiarity 
– which includes the last resort principle – and proportionality. It has been demonstrated that 
the application of these principles has proven to be insufficient to solve the problem that comes 
with divergences in substantive requirements for criminalisation.200 It is therefore necessary to 
take a different perspective on the matter. Accordingly, the question of which values should be 
expressed by means of criminal prohibitions can also be answered at a level that goes beyond 
the level of governing principles, that is to say at the level of the objectives that criminal 
prohibitions should achieve.  
Thinking over the aforementioned distinction between securitised criminalisation and functional 
criminalisation I became aware of the importance to agree on the objectives of criminalising 
people’s behaviour, provided that such objectives are formulated in more concrete terms than is 
done with the terms “securitised” and “functional”. Such an approach has the potential to guide 
the development of single substantive requirements. As a matter of fact, the identification of the 
objectives that EU-wide criminal prohibitions may legitimately pursue – both in view of the very 
goals of the European Union and in view of the need for careful and coherent law-making in 
matters of criminal law – will facilitate the articulation of substantive requirements that must 
underpin the adoption of criminal prohibitions. It is therefore needed to explore which possible 
objectives may legitimately justify the adoption of criminal prohibitions at the EU-level. In the 
course of this, traditional criminalisation doctrines will provide important sources of knowledge.  
 
In debating the underlying values of EU-level criminalisation at the level of the objectives that 
criminalisation should aim to pursue, a number of concrete questions arises, such as: Would the 
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200 See supra Section II.C.1.  
 
This is a working article. The final version of this article will appear in 23 Colum. J. Eur. L (2017). 
perceived immorality of behaviour constitute a sufficient reason to forbid this behaviour in the 
context of EU law?; would it be justified to prohibit conduct which “only” creates a danger of 
harm?; etcetera. Over the past decades, the question of what reasons do and do not justify 
criminalisation has extensively been debated. Several theories have been developed over time, 
predominantly within the context of national law. The two most important and influential 
theories are the principle of harm-doctrine and the so-called Rechtsgut-theory. The doctrine of 
the harm principle has been articulated in the common law world and originates from John Stuart 
Mill’s argument that individual freedom can only be limited for the purpose of preventing harm 
to others.201 Throughout the decades, this idea has been further developed. Several scholars 
have broadened Mill’s concept of harm by also including harm to self and offensive conduct.202 
Moreover, it has increasingly been debated whether it would be justified to criminalise conduct 
that does not cause harm per se, but creates a risk of harm, and if so how remote this harm may 
be to justify criminalisation.203  
The Rechtsgut-theory is of German origin and basically states that criminal law serves the 
protection of Rechtsgüter, i.e. legally protected interests, and also referred to as legal goods.204 
Whether and to what extent this theory is capable of properly limiting the scope of substantive 
criminal law obviously depends on the definition of legal goods, but the vast majority of legal 
scholars agree on that only fundamental liberties and values are eligible for being qualified as 
                                                          
201 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM; LIBERTY; REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (John Stuart Mill, 1968 
edition).  
202 See on this Feinberg’s 4-volume work: JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984-1988). Volume 2 
deals with “Offense to Others”, Vol. 3 concerns “Harm to Self”. Further on offensive conduct, see INCIVILITIES: 
REGULATING OFFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR (A.P. Simester & Andreas von Hirsch eds., 2006); Wolfgang Wohlers, Criminal Liability 
of Offensive Behaviour in Public Spaces, in LIBERAL CRIMINAL THEORY. ESSAYS FOR ANDREAS VON HIRSCH 247-265 (A.P. 
Simster, Antje Du Bois-Pedain & Ulfrid Neumann eds., 2014).   
203 To mention only a selection of papers: R.A. Duff & S.E. Marshall, ‘Remote Harms’ and the Two Harm Principles, in 
LIBERAL CRIMINAL THEORY. ESSAYS FOR ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, supra note 202, at 205-223; Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalising 
Remote Harm and the case of Anti-Democratic Activity, 28 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, 2697-2738 (2007); Dennis J. Baker, 
The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, 10 NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 370-391 (2007).  
204 On the origins and development of the Rechtsgut-theory, see, e.g., PETER SINA, DIE DOGMENGESCHICHTE DES 
STRAFRECHTLICHEN BEGRIFFS “RECHTSGUT” (1962); Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime – A 
Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 345-417 (1965-
1966); Sabine Swoboda, Die Lehre vom Rechtsgut und ihre Alternativen, 122 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE 
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 24-50 (2010).  
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legal goods.205 If only because “protection from harm” can be considered a “legal good” in the 
sense of the Rechtsgut-theory, it cannot be surprising that both theories have been the object of 
comparative legal research.206 Furthermore, some scholars have examined if both theories could 
be combined.207  
 
Because of their significant influence on contemporary criminal justice, it is of utmost relevance 
to examine the added value of both theories in the context of identifying the legitimate objectives 
of EU-level criminalisation. It has been argued that until now the importance of values for EU-
level criminalisation has predominantly been acknowledged at the level of principles, at the 
expense of sufficient attention for the objectives of criminalisation of conduct at the EU level. 
But the time is ripe to debate this latter aspect, especially since the focus on EU objectives has 
been sharply criticized and is considered to weaken the limiting effect of principles such as 
subsidiarity and proportionality.208 Which other objectives are legitimate objectives to achieve 
by means of criminalising conduct at the EU level?  
A thorough inquiry into what the widely supported and well-developed doctrines of harm 
prevention and Rechtsgüterschutz could contribute to the development of a single framework 
for EU criminalisation is more than welcome. It may well be that the application of these theories 
or elements thereof in the EU context help to identify the legitimate objectives of criminalisation 
of conduct at the EU-level.209  
 
                                                          
205 See, e.g., Claus Roxin, Der gesetzgebungskritische Rechtsgutbegriff auf dem Prüfstand, 160 GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV 
FÜR STRAFRECHT, 433-453 (2013); see also Winfried Hassemer, Darf es Straftaten geben, die ein strafrechtliches 
Rechtsgut nicht in Mitleidenschaft ziehen?, in DIE RECHTSGUTSTHEORIE. LEGIMITATIONSBASIS DES STRAFRECHTS ODER 
DOGMATISCHES GLASPERLENSPIEL? 57-64 (Roland Hefendehl, Andrew von Hirsch & Wolfgang Wohlers eds., 2003).  
206 Eser, supra note 204; Swoboda, supra note 204.  
207 Winfried Hassemer, The Harm Principle and the Protection of “Legal Goods” (Rechtsgüterschutz): a German 
Perspective, in LIBERAL CRIMINAL THEORY. ESSAYS FOR ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, supra note 202, at 187-204; Kai Ambos, The 
Overall Function of International Criminal Law: Striking the Right Balance Between the Rechtsgut and the Harm 
Principles. A Second Contribution Towards a Consistent Theory of ICL, 9 CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, 301-329 (2015) 
(examining the possibilities to combine both theories for the aim of their potential transfer to the level of 
international criminal law); Andrew von Hirsch, Der Rechtsgutbegriff und das ‘Harm Principle’, in DIE 
RECHTSGUTSTHEORIE. LEGIMITATIONSBASIS DES STRAFRECHTS ODER DOGMATISCHES GLASPERLENSPIEL?, supra note 205, at 13-25.  
208 See supra Section II.C.1.  
209 By analogy with Kai Ambos’ effort to develop a theory of criminalisation for international criminal law, see Ambos, 
supra note 207.  
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2. Reconciling Traditional Criminalisation Doctrines and EU Criminal Law Singularities: An 
Impetus to Further Research 
 
It follows from what precedes that the harm principle doctrine as well as the Rechtsgut-theory 
have been developed in the context of national criminal law. And it is indeed reasonably expected 
that the nationally agreed legitimate objectives of criminalisation can be transferred to the EU 
context. Yet some distinct characteristics in EU criminal law will undisputedly raise new issues in 
the course of developing a single legal framework. Albeit non-exhaustively the following 
mentions two issues that I consider to be in pressing need for further study. 
 
One of these issues arises in the context of regulatory criminalisation powers. In addition to the 
explicit regulatory criminalisation competence of Article 83(2) TFEU, a number of other Treaty 
provisions have been interpreted as ancillary legal bases for regulatory criminalisation. It has 
been demonstrated that these ancillary competences relate to EU policy areas in which criminal 
prohibitions may also be adopted under the heading of Article 83(2) TFEU which generally covers 
previously harmonised EU policy areas.210 Unlike the explicit legal basis in Article 83(2) TFEU, 
however, most of the ancillary legal bases for regulatory criminalisation fall outside the scope of 
Title V TFEU on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. As a consequence, the adoption of 
criminal prohibitions on the basis of an ancillary competence may be easily justified by referring 
to the expected positive influence of criminalisation on further market integration.  
One may ponder that elements of market integration are also relevant under Article 83(2) TFEU, 
which is true; criminal prohibitions adopted under its heading aim to contribute to the effective 
implementation of an already harmonised EU policy. It must however be emphasized that Article 
83(2) TFEU requires much more than a mere link to market integration.211  
The predominance of market imperatives in the context of criminal law legislation might be 
considered to be at odds with the widespread belief amongst criminal law experts that the 
criminal law should be reserved for the most serious infringements on rights, freedoms, and 
                                                          
210 Supra Section I.B. provides an overview. 
211 See supra Section I.B.1.  
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human dignity. This belief is again built on the invasive character of criminal law enforcement for 
which the legislative act criminalising behaviour is a necessary condition. This brings us to the 
question which values the EU wishes to reflect in exercising its regulatory criminalisation powers. 
How should considerations of economic nature be approached in view of the traditional 
criminalisation theories as mentioned above? For instance, should we agree on market 
integration as a “legal good” that deserves protection by means of criminal law? In other words: 
could market integration be identified as a legitimate objective of EU-level criminalisation? 
Because of the (potential) influence of market considerations on the scope of substantive 
criminal law in the EU, future research should examine whether the purpose of market 
integration could be embedded in the theory of the harm principle and/or the Rechtsgut-theory.  
 
A second issue that deserves particular attention in the context of EU-level criminalisation is the 
purpose of smooth judicial cooperation between the Member States. Yet recently the facilitation 
of judicial cooperation has been one of the reasons to adopt criminal prohibitions in several areas 
of crime, for instance in the areas of market abuse212 and child sexual abuse213. It concerns an 
issue that for obvious reasons has never been mentioned in criminalisation debates at the 
national level, but if we shift to the EU level it is evident why smoother judicial cooperation 
constitutes a relevant aspect in the context of harmonising criminal prohibitions throughout the 
entire Union. It needs no explanation that a foreign search warrant in a child pornography case 
is easier to execute when the criminal laws of both Member States provide for the same 
definitions of child pornography, or at least cover the same conduct in this area. Moreover, that 
way offenders would be prevented from forum shopping. Whereas variations in the scope of 
                                                          
212 See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, Preamble, Recital 1 and Explanatory Memorandum at 8, 
COM(2011) 654 final; See also Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse) and the Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing 
and market manipulation, particularly §§ 3.2.3. and 5.4.4. as well as Annex 8 at 167-168 (SEC(2011) 1217 final).  
213 See European Commission, Proposal for a Framework Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(repealing Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA) on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography, Explanatory Memorandum at 2, COM(2009) 135 final (the proposal was later on changed into a 
proposal for a Directive, COM(2010) 94 final). See also Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, repealing 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, particularly §§ 2.2, 2.4, 3.1 and 4.3 (SEC(2009), 355 final).  
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criminal offences would encourage (future) offenders to move to a Member State with more 
lenient criminal laws, harmonised definitions of offences would make such comparative shopping 
less evident.214 
It may well be so that harmonised definitions of offences facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal 
affairs, but does this automatically turn the facilitation of judicial cooperation into a legitimate 
objective to be achieved through criminalisation? Can this objective be part of the overall 
function of EU-level criminalisation of conduct? To date, these questions have been neglected in 
the EU criminal policy debate. However, since the facilitation of judicial cooperation apparently 
constitutes a factor of relevance for the EU legislature, it has to be part of the debate how these 
questions should be approached with reference to the harm principle-doctrine and the 
Rechtsgut-theory.  
 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
The writing of this article has been started under the premise to make a case for a single legal 
framework for criminalisation of conduct at the EU-level. In finishing my argument for this case 
it was, however, felt that I should also share my own thoughts on the design of such a single legal 
framework. It underlines why previously formulated sets of criminalisation principles and criteria 
must be held inadequate to solve the divergences in criminalisation requirements under the 
various (potential) legal bases. Besides, in the course of writing, my ideas on the design of a more 
adequate single legal framework started to develop and it was hard to resist sharing them.  
Because of its interfering consequences, the exercise of EU criminalisation powers deserves 
thorough and ongoing debating. As I am well aware that this paper leaves many questions 
unanswered, and, presumably, other questions not asked, this paper hopefully provides enough 
                                                          
214 The wish to avoid forum shopping has also been expressed in the course of designing criminal prohibitions in the 
areas of market abuse and child sexual abuse. With regard to market abuse, see Impact Assessment accompanying 
the Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, supra note 212, § 
3.2.3. With regard to child sexual abuse, see Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Framework 
Decision on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, supra note 213, § 
2.4.  
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sources of inspiration to provoke further academic debate on the scope and limits of 
criminalisation competences in the EU legal order.  
 
